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The mapping of the human genome, completed last year, is a major landmark in the history of
science. The genome is the set of instructions by which every human being develops and which
makes every human being unique. The deeper investigation of this set of instructions through
research offers unprecedented opportunities to prevent disease and enhance health. This research
requires the skills of scientists and clinicians from a variety of disciplines. Crucially, it requires the co-
operation of individuals who are prepared to donate bodily samples such as saliva or blood that can
be analysed for genetic markers for certain diseases. Major advances in understanding the genetic
origins of diseases such as breast cancer, spina bifida and schizophrenia have been made in this
country through the close co-operation of scientists, clinicians and patients and their families.
Important ethical issues arise about the conditions under which patients and their families are invited
to donate bodily samples. What information should be provided to patients and families so that they
can make an informed decision to donate a sample? What steps should be taken to protect the
privacy of the information collected? What, if anything, should donors be told about the examination
of samples they have donated? Do donors have rights to any intellectual property that may arise as
a result of the research involving their sample? What protections, if any, are required if samples are
transferred for analysis to another country?
The Health Research Board, which is involved in genetic studies to identify the genes associated with
schizophrenia and alcoholism and to research the link between folic acid and neural tube defects
(spina bifida) and orofacial clefts, has had to consider these issues to ensure that these studies
conform to the highest ethical standards. In reviewing its procedures, the Board was fortunate to have
the assistance of Asim Sheikh BL, of the Division of Legal Medicine, University College Dublin. The
Board has decided to put Mr Sheikh’s report in the public domain to encourage discussion on the
ethics of genetic research. The report should also be of assistance to those engaging in such research,
to prospective participants in genetic research and to members of research ethics committees
charged with responsibility for reviewing the protocols and procedures of research proposals for
genetic research. The Board is publishing this report as the first in what it hopes will be a series on










1 At: http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/medicine/medicine.html. See also: Jimenez-Sanchez et al. ‘Human Disease Genes’
Nature, 409, 15 February, 2001: 853.
1. Introduction
Even before the announcement of the partial completion of the Human Genome Project (HGP),
research into the genetic basis of disease was being undertaken in many countries, Ireland among
them. Thus, for example, the Health Research Board (HRB) is currently involved in three important
studies relating to the exploration of the genetic basis of schizophrenia, alcoholism, neural tube
defects and orofacial clefts. The importance of such research cannot be over emphasised. With the
completion of the HGP, it is hoped that the link between the estimated 31,000 genes in the human
genome and the causes of disease can now begin to be established. The US Department of Energy
and the National Institutes of Health give an overview of post-HGP possibilities in relation to
predicting disease and disease intervention, stating:
All diseases have a genetic component, whether inherited or resulting from the body’s
response to environmental stresses like viruses or toxins. The successes of the Human
Genome Project (HGP) have even enabled researchers to pinpoint errors in genes, the
smallest units of heredity, that cause or contribute to disease.
The ultimate goal is to use this information to develop new ways to treat, cure, or even
prevent the thousands of diseases that afflict humankind. But the road from gene
identification to effective treatments is long and fraught with challenges…
Within the next decade, researchers will find most human genes. Explorations into the
function of each one, a major challenge extending far into the 21st century, will shed light
on how faulty genes play a role in disease causation. With this knowledge, commercial efforts
will shift away from diagnostics and toward developing a new generation of therapeutics
based on genes. Drug design will be revolutionized as researchers create new classes of
medicines based on a reasoned approach, using gene sequence and protein structure
function information rather than the traditional trial-and-error method. The drugs, targeted
to specific sites in the body, promise to have fewer side effects than many of today’s
medicines.
The potential for using genes themselves to treat disease, known as gene therapy, is the most
exciting application of DNA science. It has captured the imaginations of the public and the
biomedical community for good reason. This rapidly developing field holds great potential
for treating or even curing genetic and acquired diseases, using normal genes to replace or
supplement a defective gene or to bolster immunity to disease (e.g., by adding a gene that
suppresses tumor growth).1
The purpose of this paper is to examine the legal and ethical issues that should be considered before
researchers commence genetic research which entails the study of the genetic basis of disease. The
paper deals mainly with the legal and ethical concerns regarding the nature of the consent that
should be obtained from biological/bodily sample/DNA donors who donate biological/bodily/DNA
7
2 Here, the phrase ‘coded sample’ is taken from the US National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC). The NBAC
describes such a research sample as follows: ‘Sometimes termed “linked” or “identifiable”, these samples are
supplied by repositories to investigators from identified specimens with a code rather than with personally
identifying information, such as a name or Social Security Number.’ NBAC. Research Involving Human Biological
Materials: Ethical Issues and Policy Guidance: Executive Summary (NBAC, Rockville, Maryland, 1999) at 1.
samples that will be utilised as ‘coded samples’2 by researchers for the purposes of discovering the
genetic basis of disease. Such donors are ‘donor participants’ (where research subjects donate
biological/bodily sample/DNA for the purposes of non-therapeutic research in which the donors do
not receive treatment) in genetic research, as opposed to ‘patient participants’ (where research
subjects actually receive treatment of some kind, for example, gene therapy).
For the above future possibilities to become a reality, there is no doubt that the donation of
biological/bodily/DNA samples is imperative in order that such research flourishes, continues and
progresses. However, there are many ethical and medico-legal questions regarding the issue of what
can and will be done with such samples and these questions must be discussed and analysed in some
depth once researchers contemplate this type of genetic research. Such approach is an essential
aspect of any research protocol and will ultimately benefit all involved by ensuring that the research
is carried out within an ambience of candour, trust and safety, such that participants will be safe, feel
comfortable and secure and thereby more willing to participate in research that, it is hoped, will
provide better prognosis, therapy, treatment and maybe even a cure for the condition which
participants suffer from.
The following illustrates the context in which the legal and ethical issues relating to consent to
participate in genetic research arise:
Patient X is asked to donate a blood sample for the purposes of genetic research which is being
carried out in Ireland and in conjuction with a Non-EU State into the causes of a disease that is
a major cause of disability in the population. He/she is told that some minimal payment will be
involved and that the sample will be used for purpose A and in the future might or might not
be used for purpose B. He/she is not told whether anyone else might have access to the sample.
He/she is not sure if there is any direct benefit in terms of treatment to him/her. He/she is then
told that if he wishes to participate he/she should take the consent form home, have a read of
it then sign and return it… 
CASE STUDY
It is clear that a plethora of questions of a medico-legal/ethical nature arise, for example: What
information should researchers give to donors of bodily samples before such samples can be
obtained? Can samples be used for only one type of genetic study or might they be used for other
future genetic studies and, if so, should consent be re-obtained at a later stage or when the initial
sample is obtained? Who will have access to the samples given? Can confidentiality/privacy rights of
subjects be properly protected? Does the donor have the right to request that such sample be
destroyed? Should there be a financial incentive for the donor? These are some of the complex issues
that will be discussed in this paper. In order to explore properly all of the important and difficult legal
8
and ethical issues pertaining to the topic of participation in genetic research, the paper will discuss in
some depth:
(i) the law in relation to informed consent in the everyday standard healthcare setting and what
information is required to be normally disclosed in order for a consent to be properly informed
and valid;
(ii) the requirements that are necessary for consent to be properly informed and valid in the case of
non-therapeutic genetic research;
(iii) the issue of confidentiality that will take into account the requirements of EC Directive 95/46/EC,
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement
of Such Data;
(iv) the international ethical consensus on the issue of consent to genetic research.
A sample Consent Form, reflecting the status of current legal thinking and international ethical
guidelines, is included as an Appendix to this report.
9
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3 Kennedy & Grubb. Eds. Principles of Medical Law (Oxford University Press, UK, 1998) at 110.
4 In re a Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No. 2) [1996] 2 IR 79 at 156, per Denham J.
5 ibid.
6 Mason & McCall Smith. Law & Medical Ethics 5th Ed. (Butterworths, Great Britain, 1999) at 278-279.
2. The Doctrine of ‘Informed Consent’
It is axiomatic that the observance of the doctrine of consent marks the starting point and is the
primary essence of both medical treatment and ethical research. Kennedy and Grubb state that the
doctrine of consent is ‘better expressed as respect for a person’s bodily integrity stemming from a
right of self-determination’.3 In Ireland, the Supreme Court has observed:
The requirement of consent to medical treatment is an aspect of a person’s right to bodily
integrity under Article 40, s. 3 of the Constitution.4
The Court has also made it clear that:
If medical treatment is given without consent it may be trespass against the person in civil
law, a battery in criminal law and a breach of the individual’s constitutional rights.5
By virtue of the importance of the doctrine as a pre-requisite to healthcare and as a fundamental
human right, it is imperative that healthcare providers and researchers have an in-depth
understanding of it as it works in everyday healthcare and then in the context of research.
Mason & McCall Smith6 indicate that, depending on the situation, the informed consent and the
nature of the information to be disclosed to a patient will vary. This will depend on whether the
situation is one of everyday standard healthcare or of research. Thus, informed consent can be divided
up into informed consent with regard to everyday standard healthcare, and informed consent with
regard to research. Due to the importance of the doctrine, it is important to examine its significance
and operation in standard healthcare in order to evaluate the manner in which the doctrine will apply
in research. It will then be seen that the doctrine has special significance when applied to genetic
research.
2.1 The Principle of Informed Consent as applied in Standard
Healthcare Provision and Treatment
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity.
2. In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be respected in particular: the
free and informed consent of the person concerned, according to the procedures laid
down by law… 
EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, 2000
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It is now a well-established tenet of law that, before a patient embarks on any course of medical
treatment, his/her consent must be obtained. The reason for this necessity is that it is meant to best
protect the autonomy of the patient. A patient expresses his/her autonomy or right to self-
determination in law by giving his/her consent to medical treatment. Consent can be implied, verbal
or written. It is accepted without a doubt that:
The patient has the right to chart his own destiny, and the doctor must supply the patient
with the material facts the patient will need in order to intelligently chart that destiny with
dignity.7
Consent must be valid consent. A valid consent is one that: (i) is made by a person with capacity8 (ii)
is voluntarily given, without any element of duress and (iii) is given with the requisite information of
risks, side-effects and alternatives such that the patient is able to make an informed decision as to
whether or not to proceed with treatment.
Such consent given by a patient is known as an ‘informed consent’ since the patient is in the
knowledge of and understands the full ‘material facts’ before he/she gives the required consent to the
procedure.9 The doctrine of ‘informed consent’ is explained by Lord Scarman in the following terms:
…where there is a ‘real’ or ‘material’ risk inherent in the proposed operation (however
competently and skilfully performed) the question whether and to what extent a patient
should be warned before he gives his consent is to be answered not by reference to medical
practice but by accepting as a matter of law that, subject to all proper exceptions (of which
the court, not the profession is the judge), a patient has the right to be informed of the risks
inherent in the treatment which is proposed.10
7 Miller v. Kennedy 85 Wash. 2d 151,530P. 2d 334 (1975) aff’g 11 Wash. App. 272, 522P. 2d 852 (1974).
8 The British Medical Association (BMA) states: ‘To demonstrate capacity individuals should be able to: understand
in simple language what the medical treatment is, its purpose and nature and why it is being proposed; understand
its principal benefits, risks and alternatives; understand in broad terms what will be the consequences of not
receiving the proposed treatment; retain the information for long enough to make an effective decision; and make
a free choice (i.e. free from pressure).’ BMA. Consent Tool Kit (BMA, London, 2001) at 18.
9 The term ‘informed consent’ was first used in the American case of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Junior University Board
of Trustees (317 P 2d 170 (Cal, 1957)) where Judge Bray, at p. 181, stated that the doctor had a duty to disclose
to the patient ‘any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the
proposed treatment… in discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed consistent
with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent’.
10 infra, n13., per Lord Scarman at 649. It should be noted that Lord Scarman’s was the dissenting judgment.
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11 The ‘Bolam Test’ is that whereby, traditionally, a doctor will not have acted negligently where he acted ‘in
accordance with the practice accepted by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art’: Bolam
v. Friern Hospital [1957] 2 All ER 118 (QB). Such a test is used in two contexts: (i) to decide the question of whether
a particular instance of diagnosis or treatment met a requisite standard of care and (ii) to decide the question of
whether the proper amount of information was given to a patient, such that the patient’s consent could be
deemed to be a valid one. It should however, be noted that this paternalistic test that seemed to completely vest
the standard of care with the medical profession has been eroded certainly in Ireland by virtue of the Supreme
Court decision in Dunne v. National Maternity Hospital [1989] IR 91 and now also in the UK by virtue of the House
of Lords’ decision in Bolitho v. City & Hackney HA [1998] Lloyd’s LR Med. 28; both decisions are authority for the
proposition that in certain cases, where there are ‘inherent defects’ in the medical processes supported by the
medical experts as being the standard procedure, then where those processes cannot withstand logical analysis by
the law, the law may not support such processes. For further analysis on this point, see: Sheikh, A.A. & Cusack,
D.A. ‘Collins v. Mid-Western Health Board and O’Connor: GPs, Hospital Doctors, Hospitals and their Duty of Care’
Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 6 (2000) 1: 4 at 10-12.
12 Davies, M. Textbook on Medical Law 2nd Ed. (Blackstone Press, London, 1998) at 162.
2.2 The Healthcare Provider’s Duty of Disclosure of Facts for the
Purposes of a Valid Consent
2.2.1 Pre-Treatment Disclosure
Although in theory the concept of informed consent is relatively well understood, the issue of what
is to be regarded as a ‘material fact’ to be disclosed by the healthcare provider to a patient, is
somewhat more difficult to answer: (i) Is the healthcare provider obliged to disclose every risk to the
patient, regardless of its minimality or medical insignificance? (ii) Is the issue of disclosure purely a
matter of clinical discretion, whereby the degree of disclosure is decided in accordance with what
would be disclosed by ‘a responsible body of medical men’ (the Bolam test/approach)?11
The former ‘prudent/reasonable-patient’ approach (or the patient standard) reflects the move in
some jurisdictions toward full patient self-autonomy, whereby the patient is sovereign and has full
command over what is to be done to his/her body and thus requires disclosure by the doctor to the
patient of all material facts to enable the patient to make a fully informed choice as to whether he/she
wishes to proceed with the treatment. The latter ‘paternalistic’ approach (or the professional
standard) leaves the issue of disclosure of facts very much to the discretion and control of the
healthcare provider, such that it is the healthcare provider who, in his/her clinical judgment, decides
what information should be disclosed to the patient.
The difference in the two approaches is explained in the following manner by Davies:
In the USA and other common law jurisdictions, the question for the law has come from the
perspective of the patient; the law will ask: How much does the patient need to know? In
English medical law, the question comes from the medical profession; the law will ask: How
much does the doctor think the patient needs to know? The difference is between the rights-
based medical law of these other countries and the paternalism and medical protectionism
of medical law in England.12
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Many countries of the common law world have moved or seem to be moving towards the
‘prudent/reasonable-patient’ approach. Until very recently, both Ireland and England seemed to
adopt an approach that lay between the two, whereby the disclosure of facts was a matter of clinical
discretion except where the disclosure of a particular risk
was so obviously necessary to an informed choice on the part of the patient that no
reasonably prudent medical man would fail to make it.13
In the UK, although the courts may not have entirely embraced the ‘prudent/reasonable-patient’
approach, it seems that they may be moving towards something similar or certainly somewhat more
towards a ‘pro-patient’ approach. The Court of Appeal in the recent case of Pearce v. United Bristol
Healthcare NHS Trust14 has, whilst adopting the Bolam approach to the disclosure of risks, nevertheless
stated:
In a case where it is being alleged that a plaintiff has been deprived of the opportunity to
make a proper decision as to what course he or she should take in relation to treatment, it
seems to me to be the law… that if there is a significant risk which would affect the
judgment of a reasonable patient, then in the normal course it is the responsibility of a
doctor to inform the patient of that significant risk, if the information is needed so that the
patient can determine for him or herself as to what course he or he should adopt…
Obviously, the doctor, in determining what to tell a patient, has to take into account all the
relevant considerations, which include the ability of the patient to comprehend what he has
to say to him or her and the state of the patient at the particular time, both from the physical
point of view and an emotional point of view. There can often be situations where a course
different from the normal has to be employed. However, where there is what can realistically
be called a ‘significant risk’, then, in the ordinary event, as I have already indicated, the
patient is entitled to be informed of that risk.15
Lord Woolf’s emphasis on the patient and the ‘reasonable patient’ may indicate a certain change in
attitude from a practitioner/professional-based test to a more patient-based one.
Very recently, the Irish High Court has also commented on the issue of informed consent. In
Geoghegan v. Harris,16 a case concerning dental negligence, the plaintiff’s case concerned the alleged
failure of the defendant dentist to warn the plaintiff of a risk of chronic neuropathic pain which might
result after a bone graft in the course of an implant procedure. The procedure was elective, but
involved both a ‘cosmetic and functional component’.17 The court found against the plaintiff,
however, following a detailed commentary on the law of informed consent, the High Court
concluded by favouring the ‘reasonable patient’ test which requires full disclosure of all material risks.
13 Sidaway v. Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643 at 663 and [1985] AC 871 (HL) at 900, per
Lord Bridge. Almost identical words were used by Finlay CJ in the Irish case of Walsh v. Family Planning Services Ltd
[1992] 1 IR 496, where he stated, at p. 521, that in relation to elective surgery, ‘in determining whether or not to
have an operation in which sexual capacity is concerned, it seems to me to supply the patient with the material
facts is so obviously necessary to an informed choice on the part of the patient that no reasonably prudent doctor
would fail to make it’. McMahon & Binchy describe this as the ‘third approach’: Law of Torts (Butterworths, Dublin,
2000) at 381.
14 20th May, 1998: [1999] PIQR P53. The facts are discussed in section 2.2.1 (a) of this paper.
15 ibid., per Lord Woolf MR, at P59.
16 High Court, Unreported: 21st June, 2000. Kearns J.
17 ibid., at 48.
17
18 The Bolam test/approach as applied to the disclosure of information has been the test that the UK courts have used
to decide the degree of information that a patient was entitled to be told. In the Sidaway case, this was the test
endorsed subject to the dicta of Lord Bridge who said that the disclosure of facts was a matter of clinical discretion
save where the disclosure of a particular risk ‘was so obviously necessary to an informed choice on the part of the
patient that no reasonably prudent medical man would fail to make it’ (supra, n13). The Bolam test/approach in
relation to the disclosure of information has also been endorsed in Scotland: Moyes v. Lothian Health Board (1990)
SLT 444, at 449, per Lord Caplan. However, it seems that the UK courts may also be shifting towards the prudent
patient rationale. A definitive English judicial stance cannot be said to currently exist on the issue of the disclosure
of information regarding risks to patients: see further: Brazier, M. & Miola, J. ‘Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation
Revolution?’ Med. L. Rev. (2000) 8, 1: 85 at 107-110.
19 (1972) 464 F 2d 772.
20 ibid., at 787.
21 (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1.
If one were to take the Bolam approach, then the issue of what risks are to be disclosed is assessed by
examining what a responsible body of medicine would do. Whatever such body decides is to be
disclosed is the standard the law will adopt.18 If however, the seemingly more popular
prudent/reasonable-patient approach is adopted, the questions to be asked by a healthcare provider
are: What would a patient regard as a material risk, such that it would be necessary to disclose for the
purposes of an informed choice by patient? Should all and every fact be disclosed to the patient or
are there certain facts and risks that the doctor ought to and can withhold from the patient in order
to protect the patient’s health. If such facts and risks do exist, then what are they?
(a) Material risks
There is no definite manner in which to define a material risk for the purposes of disclosure to a
patient. An examination of some case law in various jurisdictions can give some insight into how the
courts have tried to deal with the concept of a material risk.
The leading US case is that of Canterbury v. Spence,19 in which the doctor failed to mention a one per
cent risk of paralysis, which did in fact occur. The court severely criticised the Bolam rationale and
stated that it was for the law to prescribe the relevant standard of care regarding what is to be
disclosed and not for the medical profession. The court stated that all material risks were to be
disclosed to the patient, and what were material risks was a question decided by the ‘prudent patient’
test which states that:
a risk is… material when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know
to be the patient’s position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks
in deciding whether or not to forgo the proposed therapy.20
The court was therefore stating that, for the purposes of a doctor’s duty of disclosure, it was not what
was regarded as adequate by the medical profession that was the test to be used, but rather what the
‘reasonable patient’ would regard as adequate. The question therefore to be asked is: Would the
reasonable patient attach a significance to this risk, such that he/she would not go ahead with the
treatment if the risk were disclosed to him/her? If the patient would attach significance to the risk,
then regardless of its insignificance to the healthcare provider, it would have to be disclosed.
In the Canadian case of Reibl v. Hughes,21 there was a four per cent risk of death and a ten per cent
risk of stroke if the patient had surgery done to correct the narrowing of the carotid artery, which was
causing high blood pressure. Neither of these risks was communicated to the patient and he
consented to the operation. Although the operation was performed competently, the patient did in
fact have a stroke resulting in serious paralysis and impotence. He sued the doctor claiming that his
consent was not an ‘informed consent’.
18
The Canadian Supreme Court, followed the rationale of the court in Canterbury, stating that a
surgeon, without being questioned by the patient, should disclose to him the nature of the proposed
operation, its gravity and any material, special or unusual risks. Even if a certain risk was a mere
possibility, which ordinarily need not be disclosed, if its occurrence carried serious consequences, 
for example, paralysis or even death, it was to be regarded as a material risk requiring disclosure.22
Again, the test to be used was whether the procedure was one which ‘the average prudent person,
the reasonable person in the plaintiff’s particular position, would agree to or would not agree to, if all
material and special risks of going ahead with the surgery or forgoing it were made known to him’.23
The Canadian case of Videto v. Kennedy24 summed up the issue of risk materiality stating the following
as noted by Jones:25
(i) The question of whether a risk is material and whether there has been a breach of duty of
disclosure should not be solely determined by the standards of the profession. Medical
professional standards are merely a factor to be considered.
(ii) A risk which is a mere possibility does not ordinarily have to be disclosed, but if its occurrence
would have serious consequences it should be regarded as a material risk.
(iii) The question of whether a particular risk is a material risk and whether there has been a breach
of duty is a matter to be decided by the trier of fact.
(iv) The doctor does have a ‘therapeutic privilege’, whereby the emotional condition of the patient
may in certain cases justify the doctor in withholding or generalising information which
otherwise should be more specific.
In the case of Rogers v. Whitaker,26 the patient was almost blind in her right eye, but her left eye was
normal. The defendant doctor advised her that an operation could improve her sight. The plaintiff
asked many questions concerning the consequences of the operation, but did not ask if there was a
risk to her left eye. There was a 1 in 14,000 chance of sympathetic ophthalmia developing in the left
eye, but the doctor did not mention this to the patient and the condition did in fact develop. The
Australian High Court rejected the Bolam test with regard to the disclosure of information to the
patient and adopted the prudent patient material risk test, stating that, although the risk was
extremely small, it was a material risk requiring disclosure since the reasonable person in the patient’s
position would be likely to attach significance to the risk. By virtue of recent judicial dicta, this stance
is now also the one favoured by both the UK and Irish courts.
In Pearce v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust,27 the plaintiff suffered a stillbirth. The birth was
overdue, however, the examining doctor considered that intervention was not appropriate. The risks
involved with induction and the disadvantages of a Caesarean section had been discussed with the
plaintiff. However, the risks of a stillbirth associated with non-intervention were not discussed. The
question therefore arose: Had the plaintiff been informed of the risk of a stillbirth, would she have
22 Here, the court was repeating its own dicta laid down in the case of Hopp v. Lepp (1980) 112 DLR (3d) 67, 81
(SCC).
23 supra, n21, at 16.
24 (1981) 1254 DLR (3d) 127, 133-134 (Ont. CA).
25 Jones, M.A. Medical Negligence 2nd Ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1996) at 344.
26 (1992) 109 ALR 625.
27 May 20th, 1998: (CA) PIQR [1999] P53. See section 2.2.1of this paper for analysis of legal points of this case.
19
28 ibid., per Lord Woolf MR, at P60.
29 High Court, Unreported: 21st June, 2000, at 31-32 (Main Section).
30 ibid., per Kearns J, at 1-2 (Summary Section).
31 ibid., at 3-4.
opted for a Caesarean? The risk of a stillbirth was noted to be very small, in the scale of 0.1 to 0.2
per cent. This risk, was not considered to be a ‘significant risk’, such that there was any duty on the
part of the examining doctor to inform the patient of this ‘very, very small additional risk’,28 especially
since she was in a distressed state. It was found as a fact that, even if the plaintiff had been told of
the risk, she would still not have agreed to intervention. The Court therefore found against the plaintiff.
The facts of a recent Irish High Court decision in Geoghegan v. Harris have already been examined. 
The status of Irish law in relation to the disclosure of risks is unambiguously expounded by Kearns J, 
who states:
The application of the reasonable patient test seems more logical in respect of disclosure. 
This would establish the proposition that, as a general principle, the patient has the right to
know and the practitioner a duty to advise of all material risks associated with a proposed
form of treatment. The Court must ultimately decide what is material. ‘Materiality’ includes
consideration of both (a) severity of the consequence and (b) statistical frequency of the
risk… The reasonable man, entitled as he must be to full information of material risks, does
not have impossible expectations nor does he seek to impose impossible standards.29
He goes on to state:
It is the view of this Court that current Irish law imposes the following obligations on a
medical practitioner in relation to disclosure of risks as follows-
(a) The requirement on a medical practitioner is to give a warning of any material risk
which is a known or foreseeable complication of an operative procedure properly carried
out.
(b) The test of materiality in elective surgery is to inquire only if there is any risk, however
exceptional or remote, of grave consequences involving severe pain stretching for an
appreciable time into the future.30
And continues by observing:
This Court is of the view that the ‘reasonable patient’ test, which requires full disclosure of
all material risks incident to proposed treatment, is the preferable test to adopt, so that the
patient, thus informed, rather than the doctor, makes the real choice as to whether
treatment is to be carried out. It is the view of this Court that assessment of the duty of
disclosure on this basis is more logical than the professional standard test, whereby the Court
adopts the standard of the medical profession, yet reserves the right to override the views of
the medical experts as and when it sees fit…31
Thus, by virtue of this decision, it is clear that Irish law has now adopted the prudent/reasonable
patient test whereby a material risk is one which involves the consideration of the following questions:
(i) Would a patient attach a significance to the risk? (ii) Is there a reasonably foreseeable risk that is
attached to the proposed treatment? (iii) Would its occurrence have serious consequences into the
future? Where the answers are in the affirmative, then such risk is material and must be disclosed to
a patient. Such an approach respects patient autonomy to a much higher degree by placing the
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decision-making process regarding medical treatment firmly in the hands of a patient. The patient,
thus possessed with such mechanism and information, is in the most appropriate mindset within
which to be able to make a decision with regard to medical treatment that concerns him/her.
Consent should be considered as a process, not an event, and it is important that there is
continuing discussion to reflect the evolving nature of treatment.
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(b) The therapeutic privilege
Despite the test to be adopted in disclosing information to a patient within the ambit of everyday
standard healthcare, there is no doubt that there does exist a ‘therapeutic privilege’, whereby the
healthcare provider is allowed to withhold some information from a patient. This is accepted in most
jurisdictions, not as a complete defence for the doctor to withhold information from a patient, but
on the basis that:
Even if the risk be material, the doctor will not be liable if on a reasonable assessment of his
patient’s condition he takes the view that a warning would be detrimental to his patient’s
health.33
Lord Scarman in the same case explained what was meant by the privilege, stating:
…this exception enables a doctor to withhold from his patient information as to risk if it can be
shown that a reasonable medical assessment of the patient would have indicated to the doctor
that disclosure would have posed a serious threat of psychological detriment to the patient.34
It is difficult to pinpoint what exactly may be regarded as disclosure that is of psychological detriment
to a patient, but it must consist of such information that would cause the patient more harm than
good. The onus of establishing the justification of the privilege lies with the doctor. The justification
will be based necessarily on a clinical judgement which must be on reasonable grounds.
The US President’s Commission in its report, Making Health Care Decisions, attempts to lay down the
parameters of the therapeutic privilege, stating
…the privilege should not apply in situations when the potential harm to the patient from
full disclosure would result not from the disclosure itself, but from a treatment decision the
practitioner fears the patient might make as a result of the information disclosed. More
plausible claims of therapeutic privilege might involve certain disclosures to patients
previously known to be suicidal or those susceptible to serious psychological effects of stress,
and in situations where there is strong reason to believe that a particular disclosure is likely
to result in serious self-destructive behaviour that could not be justified in terms of the
patient’s own long-term values and goals… there is much to suggest that the therapeutic
privilege has been vastly overused as an excuse for not informing patients of facts they are
entitled to know. In the light of the values at stake, the burdens of justification should fall
32 British Medical Association. Consent Tool Kit (BMA, London, 2001) at 9.
33 Sidaway Case, supra, n13, per Lord Scarman, at 655.
34 ibid., at 653, repeating the principles that were enunciated by the court in the case of Canterbury v. Spence (1972)
supra, n20.
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35 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.
Making Health Care Decisions (US, 1983): as noted by Kennedy & Grubb. Medical Law: Text with Materials 2nd Ed.
(Butterworths, UK, 1994) at 212-213.
36 (1985) 37 SASR 524 (SC of S. Aus).
37 ibid., at 527.
38 [1954] IR 73.
39 ibid., at 81.
40 ibid., at 87.
41 Jones has stated of this dicta that ‘It may be that this approach reflects the attitudes of an earlier age, when medical
paternalism was more widely accepted than it is today’, Jones, M.A., op. cit., at 185. In Walsh v. Family Planning
Clinic [1992] 1 IR 496, McCarthy J, at 520, commenting on the Daniels case, stated ‘The learned trial judge may
well have been offending against the very principle that he was seeking to uphold.’
upon those who allege that the informing process is dangerous to patient health, and
information should be withheld on therapeutic grounds only when the harm of its disclosure
is both highly probably and seriously disproportionate to the affront to self-determination.35
An examination of some cases shows a somewhat dubious application of the therapeutic privilege.
An example of the privilege was seen in the Australian case of Battersby v. Tottman36 where the doctor
had prescribed high doses of a drug to treat a patient with mental illness. The doctor was aware of
the risk of eye damage to the patient as a result of the treatment but was of the opinion that any
disclosure of either the risks or monitoring by an eye specialist would have a detrimental effect on the
patient. The patient did subsequently develop permanent eye damage and sued the doctor. The court
decided that the patient would have reacted hysterically and irrationally as a result of her mental
condition and thus the doctor was entitled to act for her and not to disclose the risks to her. Although
this may seem to be a valid use of the privilege defence, it is interesting to note the dissenting
judgment of Zelling J, who stated that, in his opinion, no doctor was ever entitled to give a patient
such treatment as would blind her or seriously damage her eyesight without first discussing it with
her, regardless of the possible reaction of the patient. He stated in rather stark terms
…a doctor could hardly chop off a patient’s leg without discussing it with the patient first. 
I see no reason why a doctor should be able to send a patient blind and be excused by saying
‘I thought it was in your best interests to be blinded rather than have your treatment
hampered.’ 37
In the Irish case of Daniels v. Heskin,38 the doctor, while repairing the torn perineum of the plaintiff
who had given birth to a baby while at home, broke the needle and left a portion of it in the plaintiff’s
flesh. The defendant doctor did not tell the patient on the basis that it would damage her health, but
merely told the midwife to monitor for any unusual occurrences. The plaintiff eventually discovered
her predicament and the needle was removed by another doctor. The plaintiff sued the doctor. Lavery
J, in the Supreme Court, stated that no damage had been caused by the non-disclosure since the
needle was successfully removed. Her action therefore failed on the issue of causation.39 Kingsmill
Moore J’s rationale was that the therapeutic privilege was justified on the basis that whether or not
to disclose something to the patient depended, inter alia, on the patient’s
…health, social position, intelligence, nature of the tissue in which the needle is embedded…
the needle was not in any place where any immediate damage was to be anticipated;
husband and wife were of a class and standard of education which would incline them to
exaggerate the seriousness of the occurrence and to suffer needless harm…40
It is submitted that Kingsmill Moore J’s position, with respect, can no longer represent the law in this
or in any other jurisdiction, and has been criticised by leading academics and by the Supreme Court
itself.41
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These cases do reflect the fact that the therapeutic privilege ought to be used only in the most
extreme of cases and where there is a high probability of danger to the patient’s health if the
information in question is revealed to the patient. It is not and never should be utilised as a licence
to withhold material information from a patient.
2.2.2 Post-Treatment Disclosure
In the cases discussed above, the situation referred to pre-treatment disclosure and the amount and
nature of information to be given to the patient for the purposes of enabling the patient to make an
informed decision with regard to whether or not to go ahead with any medical procedure. But what
of ‘post-treatment disclosure’, i.e., where, subsequent to a medical procedure, a mishap occurs? What
continuing duty, if any, is there on a doctor such that he/she may have a duty to ‘re-contact’ the
patient where he/she thinks that there may be (a) a danger from the initial treatment rendered or (b)
a new danger from the initial treatment that has just come to the knowledge of the doctor?
McMahon & Binchy state:
the answer will depend on the degree of risk which has been discovered about the former
treatment; but where the former patient is continuing to act on the advice given, it seems
clear that there should be a stringent duty to go to some lengths to communicate urgently
with the former patient.42
It is submitted here that, regardless of the degree of risk, the courts would look towards the
seriousness of the consequences in the occurrence of the risk. It is the future serious consequences of
ignoring the risk that should be a determining factor in contemplating a duty to re-contact, as was
seen above when the concept of a ‘material risk’ was examined.
(a) The general duty to disclose post-treatment
That there exists such a duty does not seem to be in doubt. In Lee v. South West Thames Regional
Health Authority,43 Sir John Donaldson MR asked the question:
Suppose that, by accident, he [the patient] is given a quantity of air as well as blood and
suffers serious ill effects. Is he not entitled to ask what treatment he in fact received, and are
the doctor and hospital authority not obliged to tell him… Why is the duty different before
the treatment from what it is afterwards? If the duty is the same, then if the patient is
refused information to which he is entitled, it must be for consideration whether he could
bring an action for breach of contract claiming specific performance for the duty to inform.44
The same judge, in the subsequent case of Naylor v. Preston Area Health Authority,45 reiterated this line
of thought, stating that:
…there is a duty of candour resting on the professional man… This also appears to be
recognised by the Medical Defence Union, whose view is that ‘the patient is entitled to a
42 McMahon & Binchy. Law of Torts 3rd Ed. (Butterworths, Dublin, 2000) at 399.
43 [1985] 2 All ER 385 (CA).
44 ibid., at 390.
45 [1987] 2 All ER 353, [1987] 1 WLR 985 (CA).
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46 ibid., at 360.
47 Jones, M.A., op. cit., at 186.
48 Jones, M.A. Medical Negligence (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1991) at 128-132.
49 230 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964), as cited by Andrews: Andrews, L.B. ‘Torts and the Double Helix: Malpractice
Liability for Failure to Warn of Genetic Risks’ Houston Law Review Vol. 29:1 [1992] at 171.
prompt, sympathetic and above all truthful account of what has occurred’ (Journal of the
MDU (1986) Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 2)46
The question, however, is how far this duty extends and what is its scope? Thus, where the doctor
becomes aware of a further risk or of a new risk or danger from the initial treatment, what is the
nature of the duty to re-contact a patient?
If there is a failure to inform whereby this ‘may cause further injury if, for example, the patient takes
a risk that he would otherwise have avoided, or if the patient’s ignorance leads to a delay in diagnosis
(resulting in additional harm) if an emergency should subsequently arise as a result of the injury of
which he is unaware’,47 then an action can sound in negligence. However, a plaintiff will have
difficulty establishing negligence as a result of the failure to disclose information, unless the harm
caused resulted from the lack of disclosure.
(b) The nature and scope of the duty to disclose post-treatment
The situation in the future and especially in the case of genetic research will depend on the nature of
the consent form and the consent that the patient specifically gives. Consent forms will have to ask:
(i) the types of tests that the patient would like done on the sample given by him/her; and
(ii) whether or not the patient will want to be re-contacted if new information comes forward about
the initial test.
In order for this to take place, the patient or research participant will have to know the full nature and
extent of the research project and whether the results will be conveyed to them. If the results are to
be conveyed to them, then their very specific consent, in relation to the results/information they wish
to receive and any other results over and above the initial purposes of the research project, will have
to be obtained.
When, however, does this duty end, if in fact it ever does? Does the doctor have a duty to warn that
patient in the future of a potential change or further threat to his health that results from the same
initial test?
Most cases concerning a duty to warn entail situations where the doctor has not adequately warned
the patient about either a pre- or post-operative risk. In both situations the individual is still under the
care of the doctor and therefore the doctor has a duty of care to disclose any risks that may exist. In
such cases, the doctor has caused the initial harm either by making a mistake in an operative
procedure or by failing to inform the patient of a subsequent side effect of the procedure. In either
case, it is that same initial harm that has caused the later damage.48 There are certain US cases where
the courts have created duties for doctors to disclose subsequently discovered risks of treatments. In
Schwartz v. United States,49 the plaintiff, while in the US Navy, had a special dye (‘umbrathor’) inserted
into his sinuses so that physicians could take an x-ray. Several years later he learned that the dye had
caused a tumour. The court noted that the dangers of dye had been known for a long time before
the plaintiff’s illness and that therefore the Government had a duty to review the records of all the
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patients who had been treated with the dye and to warn them of the danger. The court noted that
‘even if [Schwartz] had never returned to a Government physician after his discharge from military
service, there was a duty resting on the Government to follow up those cases in which the umbrathor
had been installed’.50
The case of Tresemer v. Barke51 involved the insertion of a ‘Dalkon Shield IUD’ (a contraceptive intra-
uterine device) where the doctor neglected to mention to the patient that the device should be
removed. The device was inserted six years before the action was brought. The defence claimed that
the plaintiff should be barred from bringing the action since it was beyond the time limit by virtue of
the Statute of Limitations. The court, however, disagreed since it found that the doctor’s failure to 
re-contact the patient to disclose the fact that the device should be removed was a ‘continuing
omission’ and that the statute therefore did not begin to run until the patient learned that the device
had been recalled.
Andrews also describes the doctor’s continuous duty to a patient as a situation analogous to a doctor’s
duty not to abandon a patient. She states that:
A person who engages a physician for diagnosis and treatment implicitly engages the
physician to attend throughout the illness or until the services are no longer needed.52
She cites the case of Ricks v. Budge,53 where the court stated that a physician’s employment continues
as long as the patient requires attention, in the absence of a contrary agreement, and that, if the
doctor were to end the relationship while the patient still needed treatment, the doctor will have
abandoned his patient and is in breach of his duty towards that patient.
It is therefore clear that, in the absence of an agreement between doctor and patient ending the
treatment or limiting the relationship in such a way that the patient knows that the doctor-patient
relationship has ended, then there exists a continuing duty on behalf of the doctor to act to treat the
patient.
It should be noted, however, that in a situation where a non-therapeutic study is being carried out to
discover the genetic basis of disease and where it has been decided that participants will not receive
the results of such study, there will be no duty of post-treatment disclosure since there has been no
‘treatment’ of any sort. In therapeutic research or in a genetic counselling situation, an obligation 
may arise to inform the donor patient subsequently, if new information through the genetic 
research or genetic testing becomes available that would affect his or her condition or reveals some
other condition.
50 ibid., at 540, as cited by Andrews, op. cit., at 171.
51 150 Cal. Rptr. 384, 394 (Ct. App. 1978).
52 Andrews, op. cit., at 172.
53 64 P, 2d 208, 211-12 (Utah) (1937), as cited by Andrews, op. cit., at 172.
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54 UK Human Genetics Commission. Whose Hands on your Genes? - A discussion document on the storage, protection
and use of personal genetic information (2001) at 23.
55 Moreno, J.D. ‘Critical Issues Concerning Research Involving Decisionally Impaired Persons’ in: Research Involving
Persons with Mental Disorders that may Affect Decisionmaking Capacity Volume II (US National Bioethics Advisory
Commission, Rockville, Maryland, May 1999) at 52.
56 Kennedy & Grubb, op. cit., Medical Law: Text with Materials, at 1042.
2.3 The Principle of Informed Consent within the Parameters of Research
Genetic research is subject to the same standards as any other branch of medical research in
that informed consent is required from the donor at the time a sample is obtained. There are,
however, certain features of genetic research which give rise to special ethical issues… 
UK HUMAN GENETICS COMMISSION, 200154
The necessity of ‘Informed Consent’ within the context of research is an absolute imperative. 
As Moreno notes:
As the field of medical ethics has grown, some distinguished commentators have continued
to defend the view that no research is permissible without the subject’s informed consent.
They point out that scientific progress is morally optional, while respect for human beings
and their self-determination is not.55
Thus, from the outset, the obtaining of informed consent from a research participant is to be
regarded as part and parcel of the research project itself and not a concept that exists apart. Any
default from this absolute rule will invalidate any research project by virtue of the fact that (i) the
absence of a valid informed consent from a research participant makes the research unlawful and (ii)
any ethics committee considering a research proposal would not approve any such project without
this most vital ingredient.
2.3.1 Types of Research
There are two main categories of medical research: Therapeutic and Non-therapeutic.
Therapeutic research: The primary aim of therapeutic research is essentially diagnostic, that is, to treat
and/or cure a disease or illness. The research participant will usually be a patient, in other words, he/she
will actually receive treatment, albeit new or experimental, which it is hoped will have a therapeutic
benefit on the patient/research participant. The desired benefit is therefore direct in terms of treatment.
Kennedy & Grubb56 illustrate three situations where therapeutic research may be carried out:
(a) a doctor tests the efficacy of a new treatment where none had previously been available and the
patient would have received ordinary nursing care, symptomatic relief but nothing else;
(b) a doctor tests the efficacy of a new treatment as against other established forms of treatment;
(c) a doctor tests treatments A, B, and C (all of which are established) because it has not been
established which is the most efficacious.
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Non-Therapeutic research is where the primary aim is not immediate therapy but, through testing
a hypothesis or through the collection of data, a contribution to general knowledge is made or a
discovery of knowledge is made. Thus, although the research may benefit the subject in the future or
in the longer term, it is not directed intentionally as therapy to the subject. Non-therapeutic research
does therefore not usually involve patients who receive treatment and a desired direct benefit in terms
of treatment, but involves research participants from whom information/bodily samples are collected
and as a result of which there may be a future or long-term benefit for the participants in terms of
increased knowledge of the condition from which they suffer and/or new or improved treatment.
The main and simplest distinction between the two types of research, therefore, lies in the intention
of the researcher.
In therapeutic research, there exists the dual intention and aim of:
(i) seeking to benefit the patient who is the research subject by means of treatment,
and
(ii) gathering data of a generalised/specific nature.
In non-therapeutic research, the primary intention is that of gathering data and increasing knowledge
and not immediate treatment.
Therapeutic Example: GENE THERAPY
Research Primary Intention: Immediate treatment/therapy/cure
Other Intention: Gathering data
Benefit: Direct/immediate in relation to treatment
Non- Example: RESEARCH ON GENETIC BASIS OF ALCOHOLISM
Therapeutic Primary Intention: Identification of genetic basis of 
Research disease/gathering data
Other Intention: Long-term/future treatment/therapy/cure
Benefit: Long-term/future in relation to treatment
TYPES OF RESEARCH
Thus, research which seeks to identify the genetic basis of disease by collecting biological/bodily/
DNA samples from research participants is non-therapeutic. The collection of such samples may
identify the genetic basis of the disease by locating the gene/s possibly responsible for certain
conditions and diseases and may offer the benefit of insights into the disease, but such research will
not usually offer the present and direct benefit of treatment. Those such benefits are in the long term.
In research of any class, a high standard of disclosure is necessary. Within the parameters of non-
therapeutic genetic research, the very highest standard of disclosure is required. The requirement is
stated in the Canadian decision of Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan.57
57 53 D.L.R. (2d) 436 (Sask. C. A. 1965).
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There can be no exceptions to the ordinary requirements of disclosure in the case of research
as there may well be in ordinary medical practice. The researcher does not have to balance
the probable effect of lack of treatment against the risk involved in the treatment itself. The
example of risks being properly hidden from a patient where it is important that he should
not worry can have no application in the field of research. The subject of medical
experimentation is entitled to full and frank disclosure of all the facts, probabilities and
opinions which a reasonable man might be expected to consider before giving his consent.58
The Patient Standard is the correct standard to be applied with regard to any type of genetic research
and requires full and complete disclosure of all facts. Being research, there seems to exist no reason
to withhold any information whatsoever from the patient and the normal ‘therapeutic privilege’
clearly does not apply in such situations. The same full disclosure should apply in cases where the
patient has an advanced stage of illness and would be more willing to volunteer than a patient who
had the illness to a lesser degree. Care should clearly be taken not only in relation to the information
given, but also to the way in which it is conveyed. It should be conveyed clearly in a manner in which
the reasonable patient at such a stage of the illness would be able to understand the nature of the
procedure and the risks involved and then be able to consent.
2.3.2 Informed Consent
(a) Competent adults
Therapeutic and Non-Therapeutic Research
In the case of the competent adult, in cases of both therapeutic and non-therapeutic research, once
there is full disclosure of all facts (in relation to the objectives of the research, the personnel involved,
the procedure involved, existence of alternatives, the side-effects if any, benefits and risks, advantages




It seems that the consent of an incompetent minor to participation in therapeutic research can be
given by a proxy (an individual who can lawfully make a decision for another). This must be without
unlawful pressure. Kennedy & Grubb59 indicate that the doctor must give full disclosure to the proxy,
including the disclosure of any risks involved. The proxy must also be satisfied that on a reasonable
assessment of a risk–benefit ratio, the treatment is in the best interests of the child.
It should be noted that, before 1997, for the purposes of normal medical treatment, a minor was an
individual below the age of 18 years. Since 1997, the provisions of section 23 of the Non-Fatal
Offences against the Person Act 1997 should be noted. This section states that:
(1) The consent of a minor who has attained the age of 16 years to any surgical, medical
or dental treatment which, in the absence of consent, would constitute a trespass to his
or her person, shall be as effective as it would be if he or she were of full age; and where
58 ibid., at 442-443.
59 Kennedy & Grubb, op. cit., Medical Law: Text with Materials at 1052.
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a minor has by virtue of this section given an effective consent to any treatment it shall
not be necessary to obtain any consent for it from his or her parent or guardian.
(2) In this section “surgical, medical or dental treatment” includes any procedure
undertaken for the purposes of diagnosis, and this section applies to any procedure
(including, in particular, the administration of an anaesthetic) which is ancillary to any
treatment as it applies to that treatment.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as making ineffective any consent which
would have been effective if this section had not been enacted.
Thus, a minor aged between 16 and 18 years can now consent to surgical, medical or dental
treatment, which includes any procedure undertaken for the purposes of diagnosis, and any
procedure including the administration of an anaesthetic, which is ancillary to any treatment as it
applies to that treatment.
An incompetent minor, for the purposes of ‘surgical, medical or dental treatment’, is one who is
below the age of 16 years. The Act may be of relevance to therapeutic research since diagnosis and
treatment may be part of such research. However, due to the fact that such diagnosis and treatment
is still in the form of research, as a matter of good practice and prudence the consent of a guardian
should still be required along with consultation and serious consideration of the views of the minor.
Non-Therapeutic Research
As regards non-therapeutic research, where the benefit to the individual is not direct in terms of
treatment, Tomkin & Hanafin60 suggest the test laid down in S v. McC; W v. W,61 where a parent or a
guardian can give a legally effective consent to any procedure to which a ‘reasonable parent’ would
consent. This assumes that a ‘reasonable parent’ would not normally put the child’s interests in
jeopardy. This consent could only be valid after full disclosure. Section 23 of the Non-Fatal Offences
against the Person Act, 1997, is not relevant for the purposes of non-therapeutic research since such
research does not involve diagnosis or treatment but only the ascertainment of knowledge.62
Thus, for the purposes of non-therapeutic research, a minor is an individual who is below the age of
18 years. In such cases, again, parental consent or the consent of a next of kin would be required
along with the consultation and consideration of the views of the minor.
(c) The mentally incompetent
Therapeutic Research
As regards the mentally incompetent adult, the situation is not clearly defined and depends on
whether the research will be therapeutic or non-therapeutic. With regard to therapeutic research,
Kennedy & Grubb observe that:
60 Irish Medical Law (Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, Dublin, 1995) at 38.
61 [1972] AC 24 at 57 per Lord Hodson: This was a case where the paternity of a child needed to be determined. The
issue before the Court of Appeal was whether a blood test from the child was in his best interests. Here, such blood
test was not ‘therapeutic’ but the information gained from it would provide an indirect benefit to the child. Lord
Hodson stated: ‘Here the court is occupying the position of the parent and must act as the judicial reasonable
parent. The parent is not guilty of assault if he physically interferes with his child by way of reasonable restraint or
chastisement or for therapeutic reasons.’
62 Kennedy & Grubb also make this point in relation to an almost identical provision of the UK Family Reform Act,
1969: op. cit., at 1055.
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…consent, in the case of an incompetent adult, is no longer the relevant consideration.
Instead, the doctor stands as a proxy and is entitled in law to treat if such treatment is in
the patient’s best interest… By this reasoning, the doctor may involve the incompetent adult
in therapeutic research if what is to be undertaken is in the patient’s best interests. Clearly,
if the treatment holds out a prospect of benefit and is not available other than in a research
project, or if the prospects of benefit outweigh both any risks that may be involved and the
consequences of not being exposed to the procedure, the involvement of the incompetent
adult would seem to be prima facie lawful.63
Non-Therapeutic Research
With regard to non-therapeutic research, the legal status quo of such research is currently uncertain.
Generally, the rule at law is that no one can consent to any treatment on behalf of an adult patient.
When the adult is unable to express consent by virtue of mental incapacity, then, in normal cases, 
a doctor can only act out of necessity when the treatment is in the patient’s best interest, for example, 
in a life-threatening emergency.
With regard to therapeutic research, again the doctor must act in the best interests of the patient and
only if those best interests can be served by the therapeutic research and the benefit outweighs 
the risks.
Such necessity could not exist in terms of non-therapeutic research since its aim is not treatment.
Since there is no necessity, the healthcare provider cannot act. Since the adult is incompetent, then
in normal circumstances, he/she cannot consent nor can anyone else on their behalf. Commenting
on this general rule, Kennedy & Grubb state:
From this would follow the inevitable conclusion that non-therapeutic research on an
incompetent adult is unlawful.64
The reason for such rationale is that, in the light of a lack of consent and an absence of direct benefit
in terms of treatment, there can be no good reason to involve an incompetent adult in non-
therapeutic research. However, such rationale is based on the general reasoning that non-therapeutic
research has no ‘benefit’ to a research participant. While this may be accurate in terms of direct
benefit in relation to treatment (since treatment is not the aim of non-therapeutic research), to say
that non-therapeutic research holds no ‘benefit’ at all to the participant is not entirely accurate. This
is especially so in relation to research into the genetic basis of disease, since the findings of such
research, while not immediately aimed at treatment, therapy or cure, may give invaluable insights
into disease which may hold indirect benefits to research participants. Above and beyond this, the
mentally incompetent and minors are primary target groups for such research since it is those very
groups that suffer from certain serious diseases that will be the target of genetic research. Thus, not
allowing non-therapeutic research on these groups may entirely exclude the hopes of any medical or
scientific progress, therapy, treatment or cure at any future time. Notwithstanding the lack of legal
clarity on the matter,65 several schools of thought abound and it has been stated that:
63 Kennedy & Grubb, op. cit., Principles of Medical Law, at 725-726.
64 ibid., at 731.
65 ibid. Kennedy & Grubb state that the inevitable conclusion is that such research is unlawful. Whilst this may be
completely accurate, perhaps it is more prudent to say that the matter lacks legal clarity in light of the fact that
the matter remains untested by the courts or commented on by way of legislation.
The prevailing ethical standpoint is that volunteers in non-therapeutic research should never
be exposed to a risk greater than that which can be described as minimal… In addition to
setting the limit to non-therapeutic research at minimal risk, two further limits are recognised
as ethically appropriate in the case of research on those incompetent to consent, where such
research is permissible. The first is that the case for carrying out the research on the
incompetent should be compelling. It is not enough merely to wish to know. What is required
is strong evidence that the information which is sought will be gained and that, once gained,
it is likely to have significant practical consequences. The second additional limitation is that
the researcher must clearly demonstrate that the research must be carried out on the
incompetent, or, put another way, no other group of researcher subjects would be suitable
to generate the desired data. There is no doubt that these two ethical concerns would be
recognised as a legally relevant part of the process of determining whether the proposed
research is or is not against the interests of the incompetent child or adult.66
The situation pertaining to donor participation in genetic research (as opposed to treatment) such as
where an individual donates a biological/bodily/DNA sample for the purposes of research aimed at
discovering the genetic basis of disease and where physical intervention is minimal, as is any risk, has
not been examined by the courts or commented on by way of legislation. However, in the light of
current ethical thinking, it cannot be said authoritatively or at all (as will be examined later by ethical
guidelines) that such participation is illegal/unlawful.
30
66 Kennedy & Grubb, op. cit., at 736-737.
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The Participation of Individuals 
in Genetic Research
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3. The Participation of Individuals in
Genetic Research
3.1 The Law
Neither legislation nor judicial dicta have commented on the issue of the participation in genetic
research where that research is non-therapeutic. However, the principles of law in relation to informed
consent will apply and additional caution to protect the incompetent adult will have to be exercised
as commented on in the previous section.
As a pre-requisite to these medico-legal requirements, from the outset, the objectives of the proposed
research must be absolutely clear and unambiguous in the minds of researchers and this is ever more
so the case in a genetic study where the results may have very important present and future
ramifications for a DNA sample donor and his/her family. At the commencement of a genetic study,
several points must be clear:
Are incompetent individuals (children or adults) to be participants in the study?
If so, what procedures in relation to consent are to be utilised?
Do the proposed participants understand the nature of the study, how it is relevant to them
and all of its ramifications?
Will the research subjects be given the results of the study individually, by way of publication,
or at all?
If research subjects are to be given results, have follow-up procedures for genetic counselling
been considered and/or arranged?
If research subjects have been offered any financial reward, what is the nature of such reward
and is there any possibility that it might be construed as an inducement such that it might
negatively affect the nature of the consent given?
What assurances are in place to protect DNA samples and the information derived from the
DNA?
These are some considerations of vital importance that any ethics committee considering a research
proposal will have concern about.
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In the absence of national law and guidelines, there does now exist a corpus of International Ethical
guidelines and some European jurisprudence on some of the issues concerning participation in
genetic research that will now be considered.
3.2 Ethical Guidelines and International Jurisprudence
3.2.1 Council of Europe. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the
Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, Convention on
Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997)
The aim of the Convention is to protect the dignity and human rights of human beings by virtue of
the advances in biomedicine. It should be noted, however, that the Convention (i) has not been
signed by Ireland and (ii) even if it were, it would then have to be ratified and transposed into
National Law for it to carry any substantive legal effect.
Chapter V of the Convention deals with ‘Scientific Research’ and states:
Article 15 - General rule
Scientific research in the field of biology and medicine shall be carried out freely, subject to
the provisions of this Convention and the other legal provisions ensuring the protection of
the human being.
Article 16 - Protection of persons undergoing research
Research on a person may only be undertaken if all the following conditions are met:
(i) there is no alternative of comparable effectiveness to research on humans,
(ii) the risks which may be incurred by that person are not disproportionate to the potential
benefits of the research,
(iii) the research project has been approved by the competent body after independent
examination of its scientific merit, including assessment of the importance of the aim of
the research, and multidisciplinary review of its ethical acceptability,
(iv) the persons undergoing research have been informed of their rights and the safeguards
prescribed by law for their protection,
(v) the necessary consent as provided for under Article 5 has been given expressly,
specifically and is documented. Such consent may be freely withdrawn at any time.
Article 17 - Protection of persons not able to consent to research
Research on a person without the capacity to consent as stipulated in Article 5 may be
undertaken only if all the following conditions are met:
(i) the conditions laid down in Article 16, sub-paragraphs i to iv, are fulfilled;
(ii) the results of the research have the potential to produce real and direct benefit to his
or her health;
(iii) research of comparable effectiveness cannot be carried out on individuals capable of
giving consent;
(iv) the necessary authorisation provided for under Article 6 has been given specifically and
in writing, and
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67 In Ireland, clinical trials are governed by the Control of Clinical Trials Act 1987 and the Control of Clinical Trials and
Drugs Act 1990. They, however, are not relevant to the conduct of non-therapeutic research where an individual
is a ‘donor participant’ (e.g., an individual who donates a biological/bodily/DNA sample for the purposes of
research, but is not a patient receiving treatment) in genetic research. This is because the 1987 Act at Section 6
states that the conducting of a clinical trial is ‘the conducting of systematic investigation or series of investigations
for the purpose of ascertaining the effects (including kinetic effects) of the administration of one or more
substances or preparations on persons where such administration may have a pharmacological or harmful effect’.
The donation of a DNA sample by a research participant is clearly not an administration of a substance or
preparation nor an administration. ‘Administered’ is defined in the Act as meaning ‘the administration either
directly or indirectly to a person of one or more substances or preparations by introduction into the body (whether
orally, by injection or in any other way) or by external application (whether by direct contact with the body 
or not)’.
(v) the person concerned does not object.
Exceptionally and under the protective conditions prescribed by law, where the research has
not the potential to produce results of direct benefit to the health of the person concerned,
such research may be authorised subject to the conditions laid down in paragraph 1, sub-
paragraphs i, iii, iv and v above, and to the following additional conditions:
(i) the research has the aim of contributing, through significant improvement in the
scientific understanding of the individual’s condition, disease or disorder, to the ultimate
attainment of results capable of conferring benefit to the person concerned or to other
persons in the same age category or afflicted with the same disease or disorder or
having the same condition.
(ii) the research entails only minimal risk and minimal burden for the individual concerned.
3.2.2 Irish Medical Council. A Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour, 5th Ed. (1998)
The guidelines do not specifically separate research into therapeutic and non-therapeutic. They deal
with the issue of consent, albeit within the context of clinical trials,67 at paragraph 22.1, stating that:
It is essential that written consent be obtained if patients are to be involved in clinical trials.
The aims and methods of the proposed research, together with any potential hazards or
discomfort, should be explained to the patient.
Paragraph 22.4, entitled ‘Special Circumstances’, states:
In those who are too young or too incapacitated, as well as the mentally ill or unconscious
person, consent to take part in research may be unobtainable. Research is best avoided
unless it can be shown to be relevant and potentially beneficial to the patient and there is
no objection from parents or relatives.
3.2.3 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (UK). Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues, 
(April, 1995)
The Council’s report states at paragraph 13.16 in relation to tissue samples from competent donors:
We recommend that those involved in the removal of tissue from donors should ensure that
the explanation given to the donor is explicit about the range of intended uses of the tissue
and about any risks the donor may incur either in having the tissue removed or as a
consequence of its removal. Only on these conditions can the consent of the donor, and
hence the procedure itself, be valid.
68 The Report is in agreement with the new legislative scheme proposed by the UK Law Commission which
recommends that ‘research which is unlikely to benefit a participant, or whose benefit is likely to be long delayed,
should be lawful in relation to a person without capacity to consent…’ subject to strict safeguards. A new statutory
Mental Incapacity Research Committee is proposed that would be required to approve non-therapeutic research
procedures. In addition, procedures for approving the participation of each individual in the research project are
recommended. The Nuffield Council states ‘We endorse the view of the Law Commission, noting that it would not
contemplate the removal of tissue save in circumstances where the procedure is of negligible risk and is not unduly
invasive; where the research would add to the knowledge of the incapacitating condition with which any
participant is affected; and where the knowledge could not be obtained without involving such persons.’
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With regard to the incompetent, the Council notes the legal uncertainty in current law and notes the
UK Law Commission’s observation in their 1995 paper on Mental Capacity68 that, without a change
to the law, non-therapeutic research on the incompetent adult unable to give consent would actually
be unlawful. At paragraph 13.17 the report states: ‘Removal of tissue from living persons who are
deemed legally incompetent, where this is not part of their treatment, but is for the treatment of
others or for medical research, raises complex issues. This is because the safeguard normally provided
by the requirement for consent is not available. Procedures which provide equivalent protection have
to be devised and followed…’ The Council concludes at paragraph 13.20:
We consider that non-therapeutic removal of tissue from living incompetent adults would be
ethically acceptable only if the procedures were of negligible risk and minimal burden. The
person should not object, or appear to object, to the procedures… Additional safeguards
include recommendations that such persons should be included in research only if the
relevant knowledge could not be obtained otherwise and if the research is approved by a
research ethics committee…
Two of the most relevant and important works that have recently been produced are the Nuffield
Council on Bioethics Report on Mental Disorders and Genetics: the Ethical Context (September, 1998)
and, more recently, the Medical Research Council’s excellent Guidelines on Human Tissue and Biological
Samples for Use in Research (interim guidelines, November, 1999 and 2001). Both reports are the first
properly to address the issues of consent within the context of genetic research where a sample donor
is only a participant in the research. The reports make important suggestions and will be considered
in some depth.
3.2.4 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (UK): Mental Disorders and Genetics: the Ethical
Context, (September, 1998)
(a) Capacity to Consent
The Nuffield Council’s report is detailed and thorough and discusses in great depth all of the relevant
ethical, social and legal aspects of genetic research in the context of mental disorders. The report is
important in the context of genetic research, such as studies relating to schizophrenia or alcoholism
and other mental illnesses, in that the participants may not always have full capacity (or may have
diminished capacity or varying degrees of capacity at different times) to consent to the research. This
is a factor of the utmost importance in non-genetic research but becomes even more significant when
genetic research is involved. This is because it may have far-reaching implications on both research
participants and members of their families, whether or not the test results are released individually to
the participants or if they discover the results through other means by virtue of subsequent
publications once the results of the study are obtained and compiled. With this clearly in the forefront
of the Council’s thoughts, their report sets out at paragraph 5.23 the necessary ingredients of ‘capacity’:
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Because of the significance attached to consent, the ethical principles have been developed
in some detail in law. The law requires that, in determining if a patient has the necessary
capacity to decide whether or not to consent to a procedure, the psychiatrist or other
responsible medical officer must be satisfied that the patient:
• possesses the capacity to make a choice;
• understands what the procedure is, that somebody has said that he, or she, should
have it;
• and why it is being proposed;
• understands in broad terms the nature of the procedure;
• understands the principal benefits and risks of the procedure;
• understands the consequences of not receiving the procedure.
The report also describes very well the fact that, although many participants will have the requisite
capacity to consent, researchers must be cognisant of other problems:
7.4 …an individual’s capacity to make a particular decision will depend partly on the
complexity of the issues and partly on its risks and benefits. In considering the risks and
benefits of participating in genetic research, a person with a mental disorder will face similar
issues to those with any other kind of disorder. In most cases the personal benefits are likely
to be small, at least in the short term, and advantage is most likely to be conferred on
sufferers as a group. Physical procedures involved in genetics research are generally not
hazardous, involving perhaps the withdrawal of a small sample of blood from a vein. It is
now feasible, although less common, to take a sample from the lining of the mouth (a
sample of so-called buccal mucosa), which may be obtained with a mouthwash or a gentle
scrape of the inside of the cheek. For those with a mental disorder, and indeed for some with
a physical disorder, the attendant structured interview and family study may, however, be
psychosocially intrusive and even hold the potential for creating difficulties and tensions
within the family.
Careful to ensure that consent is properly obtained by those with requisite capacity, the report states
at paragraph 7.7: ‘The Working Party recommends that individuals who are intermittently competent
should only be approached about participation in research when competent.’
(b) The Issue of Payment to Donors
The Nuffield Council’s report also comments on the issue of payment to donors of samples. These
observations are important and, as has been stated earlier, are of great significance due to the fact
that if payment is seen to be a primary factor in research, it may be an inducement to participants to
become involved in research. This is ever more so the case with more vulnerable individuals and it
therefore may be the case that payment may erode the nature of the consent given or even vitiate
that consent. The report at paragraph 7.9 states:
Particular circumstances may impede the process of obtaining genuine consent. There may
be some grounds, for example, for believing that in the past, prisoners have been overtly or
covertly coerced into taking part in research. It is particularly important in circumstances
where potential participants in research may be confined in an institution, or may be
detained patients, to be clear that participation cannot and will not be used for bargaining.
Another concern in relation to freely given consent is the issue of personal reward. Small
fixed, or individually calculated, sums of money for time spent are sometimes offered to
individuals participating in projects. With respect to each funded project, it must be a matter
for careful ethical consideration. The assumption, for which there is no evidence, is that
people with a mental disorder may be indirectly coerced into participation by the offer of
payment. (It is arguable that a more pernicious practice was their attempted recruitment or
retention by supplying cigarettes.) The Working Party recommends that any proposed
payment for participation in research should always be carefully considered by research
ethics committees and by grant-giving bodies. Researchers who make no explicit comment
on this point should be asked to do so.
It may be prudent that the words ‘payment’ and ‘reward’ for example, are best omitted in research
material and proposals. Words such as ‘expenses’, ‘compensation’ or ‘reimbursement’ are more
suitable. A further step in ensuring that participants are neither induced nor perceived to be induced
would be to place the issue of expenses, compensation or reimbursement at the end or towards the
end of any literature explaining the research project.
In relation to the mentally incompetent, the Council reiterated its previous opinion:
The Working Party recommends, therefore, that non-therapeutic research involving people
lacking the capacity to consent to participation on their own behalf should be considered
ethically acceptable, subject to strict safeguards. Whether or not some additional, statutory
body is created… the expertise of existing Research Ethics Committees (RECs) to consider
such research may need to be broadened, and a mechanism established by the Department
of Health, which provides guidance in such matters, by which consistency can be ensured… 
The Working Party recommends that every research ethics committee should include at least
one member who has experience in the area of competence in decision making about
research participation. Where necessary, committees should seek to co-opt such a person on
occasions when such research is to be considered. (7.17)
(c) The Disclosure of Clinical Implications to Sample Donors
Whether or not information on the clinical implications of non-therapeutic research ought to be
disclosed subsequently to donors is a matter of defining the objectives of the research and
establishing whether or not the consent obtained from the donors (i) informs them that there may
be clinical implications of the research at a later stage and (ii) includes their specific consent to
receiving such information. It may be the case that they express their desire not to know and exercise
what is also called in law an ‘informed dissent’. Thus, in order for a dissent to be informed, such
information as the fact that, notwithstanding the clinical ramifications of the findings there may still
be no better therapy or cure, must be made clear to the research participant.




7.19: In a rapidly evolving field such as human genetics, it is probably inevitable that
research and clinical work will be closely entwined. Research aimed at identifying genes
related to particular disorders may depend on assembling the largest possible collection of
families with the disorder. Contact with family members develops as they may be asked to
contribute DNA samples and information about themselves and other family members.
Many will have questions about the disorder which runs in their family and researchers at
the forefront of their field may be better placed than other clinicians to answer these (but
see paragraph 7.24 below). In some areas of genetics (for example, cancer genetics)
researchers have set up special clinics to which family members at risk may be referred for
genetic counselling.
7.20: Provided that appropriate guidelines are followed and patients are not pressurised to
be involved in research, such arrangements should not raise any particular ethical problems.
Indeed, such clinics may be a very effective way of providing well-informed genetic
counselling and other clinical support to members of families that carry some of the rarer
genetic disorders. Difficulties over financing may arise, however, as such clinics are often
initially financed by research funding but research bodies may be reluctant to continue to
support clinics that provide a routine clinical service. As the discovery rate of rare disease
genes is accelerating rapidly, this difficulty is likely to increase.
7.21: More complicated ethically are situations where DNA samples have been collected for
research purposes and researchers later discover information which is of clinical significance
to the donor of the sample. This is quite a common situation in research aimed at identifying
disease-related genes. When such a gene is identified and its location and sequence
published, most research groups working in the area will screen DNA samples in their
possession for relevant mutations. Correlating the presence or absence of particular
mutations with information about the development of the disease in individuals can provide
important insights into the disease process. Such research should be covered by the general
consent that individuals will have given when they provided DNA samples and information
about themselves and other family members.
7.22: When such a disease-linked gene has been identified and significant mutations found,
the question arises as to how to deal with any clinical implications for individuals who have
contributed DNA and information to a research project. For those who have been found to
have the condition and a relevant mutation, there could be implications for relatives (who
may or may not have consented to take part in the research), in terms of their risk and also
possibilities of direct testing. For those in the research sample who do not have the condition,
the presence of a mutation may indicate a risk of developing it in the future, while its absence
may suggest that the individual will be free of the condition that runs in their family.
7.23: The ethical difficulty arises because the process of obtaining the informed consent
required for research does not usually include consent for disclosure of identifiable data to
clinics outside the strict environs of the research. Nor is the kind of genetic counselling
included that would be required for an individual seeking a genetic test for clinical purposes.
To provide an individual with information from a research study about gene mutations which
they might or might not carry and which, at the time samples and information were
collected, could not have been foreseen, could be to give them information they would
choose not to have, and/or information for which they or other members of the family are
not prepared or cannot understand in terms of its implications.
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7.24: A further difficulty is that quality controls and procedures used for clinical testing may
be different and sometimes more rigorous than those used in research studies. For example,
in some protocols for direct predictive testing in Huntington’s disease, DNA samples are
collected on two separate occasions from an individual who chooses to undergo testing.
These are tested independently and only if these yield identical results is the result regarded
as valid. Such checking procedures are unlikely to be used in a research study. For these
reasons the Working Party recommends that, as a general rule, those who consent to
take part in research should be told that individual information derived from analysis of
their DNA will not be given to them. This principle should certainly apply in all situations
where the genetic loci under study would, at best, identify only weak susceptibility to a
disorder. A summary of the overall findings of the research can be provided if the participant
wishes.
7.25: The Working Party further recommends that, in any research study that could yield
genetic information which is clinically relevant to a research participant and/or their
relatives, consent to that research should make it clear whether or not such information
will be made available. If it is to be made available then, before consenting to the research
an individual should receive genetic counselling, and give written consent to make it clear
whether or not they wish their designated medical adviser to receive information of clinical
relevance derived from analysis of his or her own DNA, and/or to receive such information
personally. Where information is to be given to research participants (or, with their consent,
to their medical adviser), the procedures used for collecting and processing samples should
be of the same standard as those used in clinical services, and accompanied by further
appropriate advice
(d) The Use of Samples for Testing beyond the Initial Use
Here the Council divides the issue into the ethical position that pertains to those with competence
and those without, stating:
The Working Party recommends that, when a person is considered to be incompetent to
make his or her own decision about participation in research, data collected for non-
therapeutic research purposes should not be used for any other purpose.
When an individual participant is regarded as competent, the Working Party recommends
that any possible further use of data in the longer term should be discussed with him or her
as part of the consent procedure; new research should, as a minimum, be submitted for
approval to a research ethics committee before proceeding. (7.27)
(e) The Use of Samples by Outside Agencies
The Council report was more concerned by the possibility of abuse by a third-party agency such as
insurance companies or finance agencies. It states simply that:
As with clinical information… access to research data, without permission, needs strong
justification. The European Human Rights Convention and recent EU initiatives on data
protection address the protection of privacy. If anything, research data are likely to be safer
because they are kept under entirely separate records systems and because, by their nature
as research databases, they tend to be seen as likely to be less meaningful than routinely
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collected clinical data. Potential problems around confidentiality should not be exaggerated.
We know of no instance in which raw research data have been used for non-research purposes
without the knowledge or consent of the researchers, nor of any where the latter may have
been forthcoming inappropriately. Researchers do have a responsibility to take all reasonable
steps to ensure that their raw, individualised data will not be used for any other purpose.
The law in relation to the EU initiatives as mentioned above will be discussed later in this paper in
addressing the obligations that are placed on researchers who are exporting data to a non-EU State
to ensure that the third-party country has adequate data protection laws or practices in place to
protect the relevant data.
3.2.5 National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) (US). Research Involving Persons
with Mental Disorders that may affect Decisionmaking Capacity, (December, 1998)
In examining the possible ‘promise of research on mental disorders’, the NBAC notes:
Of the ten leading causes of disability in the world, according to a recent World Health
Organization report, five are psychiatric conditions: unipolar depression, alcohol use, bipolar
affective disorder, schizophrenia and obsessive compulsive disorder.69
With a greater understanding of how genetic factors may be partly or wholly causative of such
conditions, projects to understand the genetic basis of such conditions will be vital and on the
increase. The issue of consent within the context of research where participants may have varying
degrees of capacity becomes more complex, since it is not the case that mental disability vitiates or
diminishes the necessity for consent, but merely that mental disability may diminish the means by
which an individual can express consent. It is clear that additional protection is required for such
participants to ensure that the right of self-determination is equally respected in such cases as in those
where there is no mental disability.
Many of the concerns of the NBAC, although not exclusive to genetic research, were nevertheless
similar to the concerns expressed by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics. However, the
recommendations of the NBAC are not examined in detail here since the Nuffield Conclusions are
more appropriate in their structure and applicability within the Irish context, especially with regard
to non-therapeutic research.
3.2.6 National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) (US). Research Involving Human
Biological Materials: Ethical Issues and Policy Guidance, (August, 1999)
This Report outlines its objectives in its summary, stating:
To advance human health, it is critical that human biological materials continue to be
available to the biomedical research community. Increasingly, it will be essential for
investigators to collect human biological materials from individuals who are willing to share
important clinical information about themselves… The growing availability to third parties
of genetic and other medical information about individuals has fueled the current debate
about medical privacy and discrimination, and NBAC is sensitive to the possibility that the
69 Research Involving Persons with Mental Disorders that may Affect Decisionmaking Capacity: Volume I (US National
Bioethics Advisory Commission, Rockville, Maryland, May 1999) at 4.
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use of information obtained from human biological samples can lead to harms as well as
benefits. These concerns require that those who agree to provide their DNA, cells, tissues, or
organs for research purposes not be placed at risk. Measures to provide appropriate
protections for individual privacy and for the confidentiality of clinical and research data are
important if significant research is to continue. The recommendations provided in this report
are intended to promote the goals of improving health through biomedical research while
protecting the rights and welfare of those individuals who contribute to human knowledge
through the gift of their biological materials.70
In making its recommendations, the NBAC used the following framework:
First, research use of human biological materials is essential to the advancement of science
and human health; therefore, it is crucial that there be permissible and clearly defined
conditions under which such materials can be used.
Second, the people who provide human biological materials for research should be protected
and respected.
Third, the rapidly advancing Human Genome Project and associated technologies, as well as
the application of a molecular-based approach to understanding human disease, have
raised issues of autonomy and medical privacy. These issues are relevant to all areas of
medical research using human biological materials, not merely genetic research.
Fourth, there is disagreement within the scientific community about the nature of risks to
individuals and about the levels and types of protections that are needed to ensure that
biological samples can be used in research with minimal risks to those whose materials 
are used.71
The Report concentrates heavily on the issue of informed consent and on the issue of confidentiality72
and makes several recommendations following a very thorough discussion of the relevant issues. In
relation to the issue of consent, the NBAC states:
Whether obtaining consent to the research use of human biological materials in a research
or clinical setting, and whether the consent is new or renewed, efforts should be made to be
as explicit as possible about the uses to which the material might be put and whether it is
possible that the research might be conducted in such a way that the individual could be
identified.73
It then makes the following recommendations:
Recommendation 6: 
When informed consent to the research use of human biological materials is required, it
should be obtained separately from informed consent to clinical procedures.
70 ibid., at viii.
71 ibid., at 9.
72 The issue of confidentiality is discussed in section 4 of this paper.
73 NBAC. Research Involving Persons with Mental Disorders, at iv.
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74 ibid.
75 ibid., at v.
76 ibid., at vii-viii.
Recommendation 7: 
The person who obtains informed consent in clinical settings should make clear to potential
subjects that their refusal to consent to the research use of biological materials will in no way
affect the quality of their clinical care.74
An essential ingredient of informed consent, as was earlier discussed, is the healthcare provider’s/ 
researcher’s duty to provide the maximum amount of necessary information to the healthcare
receiver/research participant to enable him/her to come to a decision. In the context of the collection
of biological material, the NBAC recommends the type of information that might be provided:
Recommendation 9:
To facilitate collection, storage, and appropriate use of human biological materials in the
future, consent forms should be developed to provide potential subjects with a sufficient
number of options to help them understand clearly the nature of the decision they are about
to make. Such options might include, for example:
a) refusing use of their biological materials in research,
b) permitting only unidentified or unlinked use of their biological materials in research,
c) permitting coded or identified use of their biological materials for one particular study
only, with no further contact permitted to ask for permission to do further studies,
d) permitting coded or identified use of their biological materials for one particular study
only, with further contact permitted to ask for permission to do further studies,
e) permitting coded or identified use of their biological materials for any study relating to
the condition for which the sample was originally collected, with further contact allowed
to seek permission for other types of studies, or
f) permitting coded use of their biological materials for any kind of future study.75
The NBAC also ventures further than the mere intricacies of research protocol, and states:
Public and professional education plays an essential role in developing and implementing
effective public policy regarding use of human biological materials for research. By education,
NBAC is referring not simply to the provision of information with the aim of adding to the
net store of knowledge by any one person or group; rather, education refers to the ongoing
effort to inform, challenge, and engage. Widespread and continuing deliberation on the
subject of this report must occur to inform and educate the public about developments in the
field of genetics and other areas in the biomedical sciences, especially when they affect
important cultural practices, values, and beliefs.76
On foot of this admirable goal, the NBAC makes the following recommendations:
Recommendation 21:
The National Institutes of Health, professional societies and health care organizations should
continue and expand their efforts to train investigators about the ethical issues and
regulations regarding research on human biological materials and to develop exemplary
practices for resolving such issues.
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Recommendation 22:
Compliance with the recommendations set forth in this report will require additional
resources. All research sponsors (government, private sector enterprises and academic
institutions) should work together to make these resources available.77
This is a recommendation that ought to be incorporated within the Irish research context, where, by
virtue of geographic and population convenience, the existing educational structures and means will
make the achievement of this important goal easier. In the longer term, a better educated community
(scientific and medical and non-scientific and non-medical) will mean a greater understanding by
healthcare providers of healthcare receivers’ rights and a greater understanding by healthcare
receivers of the ‘good’ that is likely to benefit the community as a whole by their continuing efforts
in participating in research. The mechanism by which to foster this almost symbiotic relationship is a
continuing, imaginative and pro-active educational effort.
3.2.7 Medical Research Council (MRC) (UK). Human Tissue and Biological Samples for
Use in Research: Interim Operational and Ethical Guidelines, (November, 1999)
The objectives of this Report are set out in the introduction and are very clearly relevant to studies
which involve the genetic basis of disease with donor DNA:
These guidelines draw attention to the practical, ethical and legal issues that should be
considered when making and using collections of human biological material for research,
and recommend best practice to ensure that such collections can be used optimally to
increase scientific understanding for the benefit of human health. These guidelines should be
followed by:
• Those preparing research proposals for support by the Council that include the
collection of samples of human biological material.
• Those planning, undertaking or collaborating in research funded by the MRC using
existing collections, whether the collections were made by themselves or by others.
• Those managing collections of human materials made with MRC funding, or research
using such collections.
(a) Commercial Exploitation
The issue of commercial exploitation is sensitive. The duties of disclosure resting on a
doctor/researcher in the case of a financial interest in a biological donation that is either a part of
research or is a factor that is above and beyond the parameters of the research in question, are unclear
and in Ireland and the UK remain judicially untested. Usually, the patenting of part of a sample will
not be the primary objective, or any objective, of collecting a biological sample, but it may be the
case that at some stage during research or after it, part of the cell may be the subject of a patent
application. In this event, the question arises as to whether sample donors ought to be told, or ought
to have been told, of this possibility at the time the sample was collected. The MRC makes the
following observations and conclusions:
77 ibid., at viii.
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78 For a further discussion on the issue of gene patents and the EU Directive on the Legal Protection of
Biotechnological Inventions generally and on the specific issue of informed consent within this context, see: Sheikh,
A.A. ‘ ‘Owning’ Life: New Frontiers in Patent Law, Genetics and Biotechnology’ Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 5
(1999) 1: 23.
79 Moore v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 793 P 2d 479 (Cal Sup Ct).
One of the major concerns in allowing commercial access to sample collections is the
potential to damage the gift relationship between scientists and research participants.
Research participants may be particularly sensitive to the idea of a company or an individual
making a profit out of the tissue that they have freely donated. It is important that research
participants are made aware of the potential benefits of allowing commercial access, and
that the role of any one individual’s sample in the generation of future profits is likely to be
minimal as well as impossible to quantify. Given the possible sensitivities, it is essential that
research participants are made aware that their sample or products derived from it may
be used by the commercial sector, and that they will not be entitled to a share of any
profits that might ensue.
Patenting of inventions based on, or using, biological material of human origin is covered by
the EU Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions. To comply with the
Directive, a person from whose body the material used for an invention is taken must have
had an opportunity of expressing free and informed consent (Recital 26). This should be
borne in mind when there is a possibility that human material collected for research may be
used directly in making a biotechnology product. However, since this is relatively rare, it
should not be necessary routinely to seek consent to possible patenting from all donors of
tissue for research.
The last lines of the above paragraphs are difficult to reconcile but they seem to be suggesting that
(i) information regarding the possibility of commercial exploitation must be revealed to donors,
including the fact that they are not entitled to share in any profits, but that (ii) their consent to
possible patenting is not routinely necessary since patenting in such cases is rare.78
Notwithstanding the fact that the legal position remains unclear, one can hypothesise the question
that is likely to be asked by a court if a patient were to take an action claiming that his/her consent
was not properly obtained. As has been discussed in the first part of this paper, the question of
consent in Ireland and the UK has thus far hinged on the information that a patient should be given
such that he is able to make an informed choice as to whether or not to consent to the medical
treatment. In order to be able to do this properly, information regarding the material risks involved
with that treatment must be disclosed. Applying this rationale to the present situation the question
therefore that might be asked by a court is: Is the issue of a doctor/researcher’s financial interest in
donor’s biological sample, material to that donor’s decision to take part in the research? Putting it
another way: Would the reasonable sample donor regard disclosure of a doctor’s financial interest in
a sample as a material fact that would affect his/her decision in both giving the sample and in being
a participant in the research?
In the US case of Moore v. Regents of the University of California,79 the facts were as follows: 
The plaintiff/patient, John Moore, was, in 1976, diagnosed as suffering from hairy-cell leukaemia. 
His doctor, Dr David Golde, realised that Moore’s cells possessed unique properties which were
commercially invaluable. This realisation, however, was at no stage communicated to Moore. Dr
Golde recommended a removal of the spleen for the purposes of slowing down the disease for which
Moore executed a consent form. Dr Golde and a research associate obtained a tissue sample of the
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removed organ to replicate its DNA. On several post-operative visits, Dr Golde obtained additional
and various tissue samples which were used to develop the eventual ‘invention’ for which a patent
application would be filed, its inventors being named as Dr Golde and his associate and the invention
being patented by the University. An agreement was then entered into with two biotechnology
companies, Genetics Institute and Sandoz Pharmaceuticals. The estimated value of this agreement
was thought to have exceeded several billion dollars. When Moore returned to Dr Golde, he was
again presented with a consent form to sign and told it was a formality. After repeated inquiries as to
whether there was a financial interest involved, he refused to sign the form and instituted proceedings
against the doctor, the University and Sandoz and Genetics Institute. His claim was for a breach of
fiduciary duty by the doctor for removing his cells without his informed consent, that the
unauthorised removal amounted to a conversion (denial by another of the owner’s right over his/her
property) since he retained a proprietary interest in his cells even after their removal, and that he was
entitled to share in the profits from the use of his cells. Although the plaintiff failed on the issue of
having a proprietary interest in his cells, it was held by the California Supreme Court that the doctor
had breached his duty to his patient by not disclosing to him his interests. The Court stated that:
The possibility that an interest extraneous to the patient’s health has affected the physician’s
judgment is something that a reasonable patient would want to know in deciding whether
to consent to a proposed treatment. It is material to the patient’s decision, and thus a 
pre-requisite to informed consent.80
In Ireland and the UK, there is no ‘correct answer’ to this issue, and, in fact, such disclosure may go
beyond a doctor’s current duty of disclosure. However, in light of the principles of maximum
disclosure for the purposes of research, it may be prudent to inform participants of all possibilities
coupled with the possible, if any, benefits for them in the longer term. Unless there is an agreement
to the contrary, which in many cases will be unlikely, research participants ought to be told that their
samples may be used by the commercial sector and they will not be entitled to any share or profit
that ensue.
Although this paper will not discuss the issue of patenting it is important that, where there exist two
or more parties to the research, especially where one is a non-EU member, then issues and
agreements pertaining to the possible patenting of cell-lines and genes, or parts thereof, be very
carefully discussed, drafted and scrutinised; this is especially important due to the fact that the
patenting of such material is commonplace in such countries as the US and will become more
common within the EU by virtue of the new Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions which came into force in Irish law on the 30 July 2000.81 It is prudent that a written
agreement be in place between the parties subsequent to and subject to legal advice.
(b) The MRC and the Issue of Consent in Research
The MRC Guidelines state:
When obtaining consent to take a tissue sample for research, it is important to allow for the
fact that the sample might subsequently be useful for new experiments that cannot be
foreseen. Therefore, unless a sample is to be used only for a single project, consent must be
obtained for storage and for future use for other research. If consent is obtained to use a
80 ibid., at 484.
81 S.I. No. 247 of 2000, European Communities (Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions) Regulations, 2000,
brought the Directive into force in Ireland.
newly collected sample for one specific study only, the only purpose for which it can be re-
used is to verify the results of that study. When no longer required for that purpose it should
be destroyed. When consent is sought for research that has not yet been planned in detail,
it is important that participants clearly understand the type of research that may be done
using their sample and the possible impact it might have on them. Where a sample is being
collected for a specific project and will also be stored for future use, a two-part consent
process is recommended, the donor being first asked to consent to the specific
experiments that are already planned, and then to give broader consent for storage and
future use for certain types of research. Consent should also be obtained to access
participants’ medical records if this is likely to be necessary for future research. It is the
responsibility of the custodian to ensure that all uses of a sample are in accordance with 
the consent obtained from the donor.
The special sensitivity of the public with regard to genetics research should always be taken
into account. There are certain types of genetics research which currently give rise to
particular concern, for instance that relating to personality or intelligence. It is particularly
important that specific consent is obtained to use samples in these or other areas of research
likely to cause special concern. When seeking consent for research, information for potential
participants must be presented in a form that they can understand.
With regard to the feedback of information, at paragraph 2.7, the MRC states:
Tests done on tissue samples in the course of research may reveal information that has
implications for the donors’ future health or healthcare, or otherwise impacts on their
interests. It is important to decide before the start of a research project what will be done if
this arises.
This is important, as has been stated before, with regard to having clear objectives in the research
protocol and in any information leaflets to be given to potential participants. It will, of course, have
important implications for consent.
The MRC gives good practical advice regarding how to keep participants up-to-date about
information pertaining to their samples:
Often the clinical relevance or predictive value of a research result is unclear, at least initially,
and there will be no individual data of value to be fed back. It will always be difficult to define
the point at which a research hypothesis becomes a clinical fact. Where consent is being
sought for a specific research project at the time a sample is collected, the potential
relevance, if any, of the results for the participant should be explained and the opportunity
to receive feedback of individual results should be offered where appropriate. There should
be a mechanism in place for participants to change their minds (for instance, a contact
telephone number) if this opportunity is declined initially. Researchers feeding back individual
results must be prepared to explain their significance to the participant and advise on access
to counselling where appropriate.
It is good practice to offer research participants the opportunity to be kept informed about the
general results of research projects done using the samples they have donated, though this may not
be appropriate in all circumstances. Participants could be informed by posting information on
research outcomes on a website, or by offering them the opportunity to receive a newsletter. 
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Where the clinical relevance of research results becomes clear some time after the sample was
obtained, or where the results obtained from secondary research may impact on the donors’ interests,
such a mechanism should be used to inform donors that results of potential interest may be available
and offer them the opportunity to receive individual feedback or advice if they wish.
Where samples may subsequently be used for secondary studies, a mechanism should be put in place
to allow participants the opportunity to seek individual results that might impact on their interests,
but it is acceptable for the onus to be on the participant to seek the information rather than on the
researcher to be pro-active in providing it. The research protocols for secondary studies and the
arrangements (if any) for feeding back results to participants must be approved by an ethics
committee, preferably the committee that oversaw the making of the collection. If samples from a
collection are shared with other researchers, the custodian of the collection is responsible for decisions
on whether to feed back results.
(c) Consent and the Incompetent
The MRC states at paragraph 5.4:
The person must not object or appear to object, and an informed independent person
acceptable to the Local Ethical Committee must agree that the individual’s welfare and
interests have been properly safeguarded. Risk of harm must be negligible (for non-
therapeutic research) or must be outweighed by the likely benefits, and the research must
not be against the individual’s interests.
When seeking consent, it is important for the researcher to ascertain whether the potential
participant has the capacity to consent. There will be individuals who, while not suffering
from mental illness as such are, through grave illness or stress, in a state of altered
consciousness or reduced comprehension when samples are obtained. The validity of consent
obtained under these circumstances is questionable. If taking samples cannot be delayed
until the capacity to give valid consent is regained, participants must be given the








4. Confidentiality and Security 
of Information
An important issue within the context of genetic research is that of privacy and confidentiality of the
biological sample and data derived therefrom. Any medical information to be stored within Ireland is
subject to the Data Protection Act 1988, the Freedom of Information Act 1997, and the EC Directive
on the Protection of Data: 95/46/EC. Confidentiality between the healthcare provider and healthcare
receiver has always been protected by Common Law. These Acts and the common law ensure that
third parties do not have access to the information save with the consent of the individuals to whom
the information pertains. Thus, generally, if institution ‘A’ holds information about person ‘B’, then
person ‘C’ cannot obtain that information in the normal course of events without the consent of
person ‘B’.
Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data82
The Irish Acts protect information within Ireland. The new Directive aims to ensure that information
that is conveyed to non-EU countries or ‘third countries’ is done so only when such a country also has
satisfactory legislation or practices in place that will ensure data protection. Where that is not the
case, the information, in the normal course of events, cannot be transferred.
Article 2 provides for important definitions that lay down the basis of the Directive:
(a) ‘personal data’ shall mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified,
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or
more factors specific to his physical, physiological mental, economic, cultural or social
identity;
(b) ‘processing of personal data’ (‘processing’) shall mean any operation or set of
operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic
means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration,
retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise
making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction;
(c) ‘personal data filing system’ (‘filing system’) shall mean any structured set of personal
data which are accessible according to specific criteria, whether centralized,
decentralized or dispersed on a functional or geographical basis.
Recital 15 states that only data in the following format is the subject of the Directive:
Whereas the processing of such data is covered by this Directive only if it is automated or if
the data processed are contained or are intended to be contained in a filing system
structured according to specific criteria relating to individuals, so as to permit easy access to
the personal data in question.
82 The Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform have also published a Consultation Paper on Transposition into
Irish Law, November, 1997.
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Recital 38 states that:
Whereas, if the processing of data is to be fair, the data subject must be in a position to learn
of the existence of a processing operation and, where data are collected from him, must be
given accurate and full information, bearing in mind the circumstances of the collection.
Article 8 deals with the processing of ‘special categories of data’ and 8(1) states:
Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the
processing of data concerning health or sex life.
However, this section does not apply where ‘the data subject has given his explicit consent to the
processing of those data, except where the laws of the Member State provide that the prohibition
referred to in paragraph 1 may not be lifted by the data subject’s giving his consent’.
Article 8 (3) goes on to state:
Paragraph 1 shall not apply where processing of the data is required for the purposes of
preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of care or treatment or the
management of health care services, and where those data are processed by a health
professional subject under national law or rules established by national competent bodies to
the obligation of professional secrecy or by another person also subject to an equivalent
obligation of secrecy.
Article 10 deals with information in cases of collection of data from the data subject and states:
Member States shall provide that the controller or his representative must provide a data
subject from whom data relating to himself are collected with at least the following
information, except where he already has it:
(a) the identity of the controller and of his representative, if any;
(b) the purposes of the processing for which the data are intended;
(c) any further information such as
- the recipients or categories of recipients of the data,
- whether replies to the questions are obligatory or voluntary, as well as the possible 
consequences of failure to reply,
- the existence of the right of access to and the right to rectify the data concerning him
in so far as such further information is necessary, having regard to the specific
circumstances in which the data are collected, to guarantee fair processing in respect
of the data subject.
Article 20 deals with ‘prior checking’ and states that:
Member States shall determine the processing operations likely to present specific risks to the
rights and freedoms of data subjects and shall check that these processing operations are
examined prior to the start thereof.
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Chapter IV and Article 25 deal with the issue of the transfer of personal data to third countries, and state:
1. The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of personal data
which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer may take
place only if, without prejudice to compliance with the national provisions adopted
pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, the third country in question ensures
an adequate level of protection.
2. The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country shall be assessed in
the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data
transfer operations; particular consideration shall be given to the nature of the data,
the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation or operations, the
country of origin and country of final destination, the rules of law, both general and
sectoral, in force in the third country in question and the professional rules and security
measures which are complied with in that country.
3. The Member States and the Commission shall inform each other of cases where they
consider that a third country does not ensure an adequate level of protection within the
meaning of paragraph 2.
4. Where the Commission finds, under the procedure provided for in Article 31 (2), that a
third country does not ensure an adequate level of protection within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of this Article, Member States shall take the measures necessary to prevent
any transfer of data of the same type to the third country in question.
5. At the appropriate time, the Commission shall enter into negotiations with a view to
remedying the situation resulting from the finding made pursuant to paragraph 4.
6. The Commission may find, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 31
(2), that a third country ensures an adequate level of protection within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of this Article, by reason of its domestic law or of the international
commitments it has entered into, particularly upon conclusion of the negotiations
referred to in paragraph 5, for the protection of the private lives and basic freedoms and
rights of individuals. Member States shall take the measures necessary to comply with
the Commission’s decision.
Article 26 deals with derogations to the above rule and states:
By way of derogation from Article 25 and save where otherwise provided by domestic law
governing particular cases, Member States shall provide that a transfer or a set of transfers
of personal data to a third country which does not ensure an adequate level of protection
within the meaning of Article 25 (2) may take place on condition that:
(a) the data subject has given his consent unambiguously to the proposed transfer; or
(b) the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data subject
and the controller or the implementation of precontractual measures taken in response
to the data subject’s request; or
(c) the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in
the interest of the data subject between the controller and a third party; or
(d) the transfer is necessary or legally required on important public interest grounds, or for
the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims; or
(e) the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or
(f) the transfer is made from a register which according to laws or regulations is intended
to provide information to the public and which is open to consultation either by the
public in general or by any person who can demonstrate legitimate interest, to the
extent that the conditions laid down in law for consultation are fulfilled in the particular
case.
2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, a Member State may authorize a transfer or a set of
transfers of personal data to a third country which does not ensure an adequate level
of protection within the meaning of Article 25 (2), where the controller adduces
adequate safeguards with respect to the protection of the privacy and fundamental
rights and freedoms of individuals and as regards the exercise of the corresponding
rights; such safeguards may in particular result from appropriate contractual clauses.
With these obligations in mind, the MRC states at paragraph 2.4:
Personal data should be stored, processed and analysed in a form that does not allow
individuals to be identified, unless there is a strong ethical or scientific justification for not
doing so. Identifiable data should only be accessible to staff who have a formal duty of
confidence to the participants… When custodians of a collection provide samples to other
researchers, transfer of identifiable data should be kept to a minimum.
Further to the obligations of the Directive, its implications are that: (i) the relevant third country has
legislation or practices in place that adequately protect personal data or (ii) assurances need to be
gained by a ‘third country’ that the data received will be protected,83 or when ‘third country’
protection is not adequate then the data can be transferred only if (iii) the data subject gives his
consent unambiguously to transfer the data.
The meaning of the word ‘unambiguously’ is uncertain, but a consent could only be so if the person
giving it was fully informed and in this case it must be presumed to mean that the data subject has
been clearly told that the ‘third country’ does not have adequate protection measures in place and
also told of the full ramifications or potential ramifications of this lack of protection.
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83 Opinion No. 13 of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission,
of 30 July 1999, entitled Ethical Issues of Healthcare in the Information Society, reiterates the concerns of the EU
Directive.
In the light of the uncertainty, it is advisable where ‘third countries’ are involved in joint research
projects that a written assurance is given to the EU-member country stating that the absolute privacy
of data subjects is protected and that any third party not a part of the research team will not have
access to the information and samples and that the information and samples will be secured. This
written assurance should be both explained to potential research participants and either shown to
them or available for inspection.84
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84 It should be noted that as between the EU and US, there now exists an agreement in relation to the Directive and
the transfer of personal data from EU States to the US. This is known as the ‘Safe Harbor’ Agreement and was
agreed by the European Commission and the US Department of Commerce in July, 2000. The agreement allows
for US organisations to join, on a voluntary basis, the’safeharbor’ public list (http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/
shlist.nsf/webPages/safe+harbor+list.) To qualify for the safe harbor, a US organisation can either join a self-
regulatory privacy programme that adheres to the safe harbor principles or develop its own scheme that adheres
to the safe harbor principles. There are 7 Principles: (i) NOTICE: An organisation must inform individuals about the
purposes for which it collects and uses information about them, how to contact the organisation with any inquiries
or complaints, the types of third parties to which it discloses the information, and the choices and means the
organisation offers individuals for limiting its use and disclosure. This notice must be provided in clear and
conspicuous language when individuals are first asked to provide personal information to the organisation or as
soon thereafter as is practicable, but in any event before the organisation uses such information for a purpose other
than that for which it was originally collected or processed by the transferring organisation or discloses it for the
first time to a third party*. (ii) CHOICE: An organisation must offer individuals the opportunity to choose (opt out)
whether their personal information is (a) to be disclosed to a third party* or (b) to be used for a purpose that is
incompatible with the purpose(s) for which it was originally collected or subsequently authorized by the individual.
Individuals must be provided with clear and conspicuous, readily available, and affordable mechanisms to exercise
choice. For sensitive information (i.e. personal information specifying medical or health conditions, racial or ethnic
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership or information specifying the
sex life of the individual), they must be given affirmative or explicit (opt in) choice if the information is to be
disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose other than those for which it was originally collected or
subsequently authorized by the individual through the exercise of opt in choice. In any case, an organisation
should treat as sensitive any information received from a third party where the third party treats and identifies it
as sensitive. (iii) ONWARD TRANSFER: To disclose information to a third party, organisations must apply the Notice
and Choice Principles. Where an organisation wishes to transfer information to a third party that is acting as an
agent, as described in the endnote, it may do so if it first either ascertains that the third party subscribes to the
Principles or is subject to the Directive or another adequacy finding or enters into a written agreement with such
third party requiring that the third party provide at least the same level of privacy protection as is required by the
relevant Principles. If the organisation complies with these requirements, it shall not be held responsible (unless the
organisation agrees otherwise) when a third party to which it transfers such information processes it in a way
contrary to any restrictions or representations, unless the organisation knew or should have known the third party
would process it in such a contrary way and the organisation has not taken reasonable steps to prevent or stop
such processing. (iv) SECURITY: Organisations creating, maintaining, using or disseminating personal information
must take reasonable precautions to protect it from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and
destruction. (v) DATA INTEGRITY: Consistent with the Principles, personal information must be relevant for the
purposes for which it is to be used. An organisation may not process personal information in a way that is
incompatible with the purposes for which it has been collected or subsequently authorized by the individual. To
the extent necessary for those purposes, an organisation should take reasonable steps to ensure that data is reliable
for its intended use, accurate, complete, and current. (vi) ACCESS: Individuals must have access to personal
information about them that an organisation holds and be able to correct, amend, or delete that information
where it is inaccurate, except where the burden or expense of providing access would be disproportionate to the
risks to the individual’s privacy in the case in question, or where the rights of persons other than the individual
would be violated. (vii) ENFORCEMENT: Effective privacy protection must include mechanisms for assuring
compliance with the Principles, recourse for individuals to whom the data relate affected by non-compliance with
the Principles, and consequences for the organisation when the Principles are not followed. At a minimum, such
mechanisms must include (a) readily available and affordable independent recourse mechanisms by which each
individual’s complaints and disputes are investigated and resolved by reference to the Principles and damages
awarded where the applicable law or private sector initiatives so provide; (b) follow up procedures for verifying
that the attestations and assertions businesses make about their privacy practices are true and that privacy practices
have been implemented as presented; and (c) obligations to remedy problems arising out of failure to comply with
the Principles by organisations announcing their adherence to them and consequences for such organisations.
Sanctions must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance by organisations. * It is not necessary to provide
notice or choice when disclosure is made to a third party that is acting as an agent to perform task(s) on behalf of
and under the instructions of the organisation. The Onward Transfer Principle, on the other hand, does apply to
such disclosures. (at: http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh_overview.html). Once an organisation meets the
principles and joins the list, it is deemed ‘adequate’ and can receive data from EU bodies.
This is also within the parameters of recent recommendations by the US NBAC which state that, when
reviewing and approving protocols for research on human biological materials, Institutional Review
Boards (IRBs) or Ethics Committees should require the investigator/researcher to set forth:
a full description of the mechanisms that will be used to maximize the protection against
inadvertent release of confidential information.85
The Recommendation 10 goes on to state that:
IRBs should operate on the presumption that research on coded samples is of minimal risk
to the human subject if
a) the study adequately protects the confidentiality of personally identifiable information
obtained in the course of research,
b) the study does not involve the inappropriate release of information to third parties, and
c) the study design incorporates an appropriate plan for whether and how to reveal
findings to the sources or their physicians, should the findings merit such disclosure.86
A recent decision of the English Court of Appeal in the case of R v. Department of Health, ex parte
Source Informatics Ltd,87 apart from confirming that the Common Law will protect confidentiality, also
raises interesting and important issues with regard to confidential but anonymous information. In this
case, Source Ltd (S) wished to collect data on the prescribing habits of GPs. S then planned to sell
such data to pharmaceutical companies so that they could more effectively market their products. S
therefore asked pharmacists, in return for a small fee, to provide them with certain information from
the prescriptions they received, that being: (i) name of GP and (ii) quantity and identity of the drug
prescribed. S did not want the name of the patient. The Department of Health issued a policy
document stating that the anonymisation of such information would not remove the duty of
confidence owed to patients. S sought a judicial review of the policy seeking a declaration that it was
wrong in law and that the disclosure by doctors or pharmacists to a third party of anonymous
information did not constitute a breach of confidentiality. The Court agreed with S, the defendant/
respondent, and the head note describes the Court’s decision given by Simon Brown LJ, stating that:
In a case involving confidences, the disclosure of information by the confidant would not
constitute a breach of confidence provided that the confider’s identity was protected. In such
a case, the law was concerned only to protect the confider’s privacy…88
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85 Recommendation 5(d), NBAC. Research Involving Human Biological Materials: Ethical Issues and Policy Guidance:
Executive Summary (NBAC, Rockville, Maryland, 1999) at 4. Also note the NBAC’s most recent guidelines: Ethical
and Policy Issues in Research Involving Human Participants, May 18, 2001, which states at Recommendation 4.7:
‘Federal policy should be developed and mechanisms should be provided to enable investigators and institutions
to reduce threats to privacy and breaches of confidentiality. The feasibility of additional mechanisms should be
examined to strengthen confidentiality protections in research studies.’
86 ibid., at 5.
87 [2000] 1 All ER 786.
88 ibid., at 786.
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89 ibid., at 796-797.
90 ibid., at 799.
91 The NBAC labels such samples as ‘Unidentified samples’ (anonymous) and ‘Unlinked samples’ (anonymised):
NBAC. Research Involving Human Biological Materials: Ethical Issues and Policy Guidance: Executive Summary (NBAC,
Rockville, Maryland, 1999) at 1.
Simon Brown LJ went on to state:
…the confidant is placed under a duty of good faith to the confider and the touchstone by
which to judge the scope of his duty and whether or not it has been fulfilled or breached is
his own conscience, no more and no less… the concern of the law here is to protect the
confider’s personal privacy. That and that alone is the right at issue in this case… in a case
involving personal confidences I would hold… that the confidence is not breached where the
confider’s identity is protected.89
The other issue raised in the case was whether or not the anonymisation of such data was in breach
of Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the processing of Personal Data.
This was on the basis that Article 8.1 prohibits such ‘processing’. The response to this was that the
Directive is not applicable to anonymising data just as it would not be to anonymous data since such
data is not ‘personal data’. The Court of appeal agreed with this contention.90
Thus, it is only in the case of anonymous or anonymised samples91 that the provisions of the Directive
would not apply, since they would be unidentifiable and would therefore not come within the ambit
of the definition of ‘personal data’ which is, according to Article 2 of the Directive, ‘…any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person… an identifiable person is one who can be






92 Annas G.J. ‘The Man on the Moon, Immortality and other Millennial Myths: The Prospects and Perils of Human
Genetic Engineering’ 49 Emory Law Journal 3 (2000) at 11.
5. Summary and Conclusions
Annas states that:
We have a tendency simply to let science take us where it will. But science has no will, and
human judgement is almost always necessary for any successful exploration or experiment
in the unknown.92
The role of law and bioethics will be to provide such human judgement to the explorations that will
be led and conducted through genetic research. Increasingly, the norms and tenets of law and
bioethics cannot be divorced from science and thus ‘progress’ in genetics and research must be seen
by the measurement of ultimate participant/patient benefit. That benefit is not merely in terms of
scientific discovery per se but also in terms of respect for human dignity and autonomy. It can only
be in an atmosphere of joint co-operation between law and science that the true advantages and
potential of human genetics can be realised and maximised, with any disadvantages and dangers
eliminated, controlled and minimised.
With regard to the law as it stands on research and informed consent and having taken into account
all of the observations and recommendations of international ethical guidelines, the following points
must be borne in mind where biological/bodily/DNA samples are to be taken from participants in a
genetic study.
5.1 Research Proposals and Genetic Research: Points of Concern
1 Non-therapeutic research must have the objective of the ultimate attainment of some
benefit to participants – it cannot be merely an exercise of ‘a wish to obtain knowledge’.
2 The questions must be asked:
• Will participants be competent to give consent?
• If not, what safeguards are in place to ensure the protection of their dignity and 
autonomy?
3 Have the full extent and ramifications of the research been conveyed to the potential
participants or those consenting on their behalf, and how has this been done?
4 Research participants should be provided with a proper and full but comprehensible
information pack/leaflet; the pack could contain pictorial diagrams to explain the basics of
genetics, the research in its various steps and the medical benefits, whatever they may be,
that will or may result to the participant.
5 A presentation involving visual aids could be given to participants by the research/medical
team.
6 Individual sessions with participants should also be held.
7 Will participants receive feedback of results directly or at all?
8 If so, will genetic counselling be provided?
9 If not, are there mechanisms in place, such as the posting of leaflets or a website whereby
participants can follow the progress of the research if they so wish?
10 Are confidentiality agreements in place?
11 The research proposal entailing genetic research must have independent ethical
committee approval.93
5.2 Requirements of an Informed Consent
1 In the competent adult, consent must be valid, full and written, and signed by an
authorised member of the research team, the participant and preferably by a witness.
2 In the case of an incompetent minor participating in non-therapeutic research, a
parent/next-of-kin/proxy can give consent after full disclosure of facts and if the research
carries minimal burden and risk and cannot be achieved by other means.
3 In the case of an incompetent adult, no other person in law can consent on their behalf,
therefore in non-therapeutic research:
The opinion of a GP or other appropriate person ought to be sought to ensure capacity
when or if capacity is in doubt and families or very close friends may be consulted;
The procedure must involve minimal risk, invasion, burden and discomfort;
The individual must agree to the procedure or it must be made sure that the person does
not object or seem to object;
The research must be such that it cannot be achieved by any other means.
4 Those potential participants where capacity is intermittent should only be approached
during a ‘lucid period’ (when they have capacity).
5 Prior to the obtaining of consent to take a sample:
individuals must be told of the purpose for which the sample will be used;
and researchers must seek permission if samples are intended to be used for any other
purpose whatsoever at any time (such ‘further use’ is inadvisable in the incompetent
individual participating in non-therapeutic research).
6 Interviews and all explanations especially with a view to or prior to obtaining consent must
be impartial, without force or inducement, and should be conducted in as sensitive a
manner as possible and explained in language that the potential participant can
understand.
7 Any indications that the benefits are monetary are not acceptable and should not be
mentioned. Expenses for time, effort, expense and inconvenience are of course acceptable.
At all times, the primary benefit is medical.
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93 While this may not be a legislative obligation in every circumstance, approval by an independent and recognised
ethics board is a matter of both good practice and protocol and validates the integrity of the proposed research.
Above and beyond this, it may be a pre-requisite to the approval of financial support and grant funding that ethical
approval be received. Such is the case with proposed research that is funded through the Health Research Board
in Ireland: see Health Research Board, Grants Regulations, 1999 at paragraph 3 (a).
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8 If results are to be fed back to individuals, their consent to a whole range of issues must be
obtained:
to the primary testing;
to any other testing that will be done (having explained what those other tests may be).
9 Participants must be told if there may be a commercial exploitation of any nature of the
samples taken and that they will not be entitled to any profits (unless there is an
agreement to the contrary).
10 Participants must be told of privacy protective measures over samples and data:
within Ireland and
within any other host country: written assurances from the host country must exist, be
shown or available for inspection.
11 The participants must have the option of withdrawing at any time.
12 The participants must be able to request that the samples be destroyed.
It is with these factors in mind that the consent forms, to fulfil the requirements of a fully informed
consent within the ambit of genetic research, should be drafted.
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The ‘Safe Harbor’ Principle
These Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) are taken from the US Department of Commerce web page
(at: http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/faq14pharmafinal.html) but have been amended to reflect
concerns that may be voiced in relation to non-therapeutic genetic research.
Biological Samples, Pharmaceutical and Medical Products
1. Q: If personal data are collected in the EU and transferred to the United States for
pharmaceutical/medical/scientific research and/or other purposes, do Member State laws
or the Safe Harbor Principles apply?
1. A: Member State law applies to the collection of the personal data and to any processing that
takes place prior to the transfer to the United States. The Safe Harbor Principles apply to the data
once they have been transferred to the United States. Data used for pharmaceutical research and
other purposes should be anonymised when appropriate.
2. Q: Personal data developed in specific medical/scientific or pharmaceutical research studies
often play a valuable role in future scientific research. Where personal data collected for
one research study are transferred to a U.S. organisation in the safe harbor, may the
organisation use the data for a new scientific research activity?
2. A: Yes, if appropriate notice and choice have been provided in the first instance. Such a notice
should provide information about any future specific uses of the data, such as periodic follow-
up, related studies, or marketing. It is understood that not all future uses of the data can be
specified, since a new research use could arise from new insights on the original data, new
medical discoveries and advances, and public health and regulatory developments. Where
appropriate, the notice should therefore include an explanation that personal data may be used
in future medical and pharmaceutical research activities that are unanticipated. If the use is not
consistent with the general research purpose(s) for which the data were originally collected, or
to which the individual has consented subsequently, new consent must be obtained.
3. Q: What happens to an individual’s data if a participant decides voluntarily or at the
request of the sponsor to withdraw from the research study?
A: Participants may decide or be asked to withdraw from a research study at any time. Any data
collected previous to withdrawal may still be processed along with other data collected as part
of the research study, however, if this was made clear to the participant in the notice at the time
he or she agreed to participate.
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4. Q: Pharmaceutical and medical/scientific organisations and companies are allowed to
provide personal data from research studies conducted in the EU to regulators in the
United States for regulatory and supervision purposes. Are similar transfers allowed to
parties other than regulators, such as company locations and other researchers?
4. A: Yes, consistent with the Principles of Notice and Choice.
5. Q: Does a pharmaceutical or medical device firm have to apply the Safe Harbor Principles
with respect to notice, choice, onward transfer, and access in its product safety and efficacy
monitoring activities, including the reporting of adverse events and the tracking of
patients/subjects using certain medicines or medical devices (for example, a pacemaker)?
5. A: No, to the extent that adherence to the Principles interferes with compliance with regulatory
requirements. This is true both with respect to reports by, for example, health care providers, to
pharmaceutical and medical device companies, and with respect to reports by pharmaceutical
and medical device companies to government agencies like the Food and Drug Administration.
6. Q: Invariably, research data are uniquely key-coded at their origin by the principal
investigator so as not to reveal the identity of individual data subjects. Research
Organisations sponsoring such research do not receive the key. The unique key code is held
only by the researcher, so that he/she can identify the research subject under special
circumstances (e.g. if follow-up medical attention is required). Does a transfer from the EU
to the United States of data coded in this way constitute a transfer of personal data that is
subject to the Safe Harbor Principles?
6. A: No. This would not constitute a transfer of personal data that would be subject to the
Principles.
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